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“There seems to me to be some possibility that these provisions
may lead appellate courts into a machinery for striking down
where striking down is needed . . . .”1
Karl N. Llewellyn

* Huber Hurst Professor of Contract Law & Legal Studies, Chair, Department of
Management, Warrington College of Business Administration, University of Florida; J.D.,
Cornell University; LL.M., Harvard Law School.
** Doctoral Candidate, Department of Management, Warrington College of Business
Administration, University of Florida; J.D., Louisiana State University; LL.M., University
of Miami; M.B.A., University of Florida.
1. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 369
(1960). An alternative quote considered: “[I]t is essential that we address the problem
which we caricature as the contract between the rabbits and foxes, in which the foxes impose the clause that all disputes will be resolved by a panel of foxes, or by a panel of
wolves.” Bd. of Ed. of Berkeley County v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439, 447 (W.
Va. 1977).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Karl Llewellyn2 saw section 2-302, the doctrine of unconscionability, as providing a mandate for courts to police contracts.3 He did not
see it as providing the machinery for accomplishing or guiding this
grant of judical power.4 The doctrine of unconscionability and the
best “machinery” for its implementation has been the source of scholarly discussion ever since.5 This Article attempts to provide empirical
evidence, through the statistical analysis of cases, of how courts have
applied this mandate and whether a discrete machinery has been developed in its implementation. Ultimately, the Article assesses
whether a coherent machinery or analytical framework has been fabricated through forty years of jurisprudence.6

2. Karl Nickerson Llewellyn was the Chief Reporter for the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) and the principal drafter of Articles I (General Provisions) and II (Sales). He
is also famous for his works in commercial and contract law, jurisprudence, legal education, sociology and law, and anthropology and law. Llewellyn is most famous for his part in
the U.C.C. project and as a principal of the Legal Realist Movement of the 1930s.
3. For a brief history of the U.C.C. project, see William A. Schnader, A Short History
of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1
(1967). For a history of unconscionability as it pertains to the U.C.C. and its subsequent
development in California, see Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need
for Restraint and Certainty, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459 (1995).
4. Professor Murray expressed this view in his 1969 article: “Llewellyn completely
understood . . . that the statute is nothing more than a catalyst for the development of the
analytical structure of unconscionability.” John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 38 (1969).
5. A Lexis search of the word “unconscionability,” limited to the most recent two
years of legal literature, yielded 504 entries (search performed on Mar. 10, 2005).
6. In 1970, Robert Braucher, the principal author of section 2-302, stated that “we
are probably not much more ready now than we were twenty years ago to arrive at comphrensive reasoned elaboration of what is unconscionable.” Robert Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 337, 347 (1970). A more recent article notes
that “the judiciary has not been able to clearly delineate comprehensive rules.” Paul Bennett Marrow, The Unconscionability of a Liquidated Damage Clause: A Practical Application of Behavioral Decision Theory, 22 PACE L. REV. 27, 29 (2001). Some commentators
have argued that the failure of the courts to fabricate a coherent analytical framework
suggests that some form of further legislative or regulatory intervention through the use of
mandatory terms is needed. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard
Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003). Professor Korobkin
concludes that behavioral economics suggests that the best technique for policing the market place for one-sided or unconscionable terms is a combination of legislative-mandated
regulation through the use of mandatory terms and judicial oversight through the doctrine
of unconscionability on a case-by-case basis:
When the costs and benefits of particular terms are substantially similar across
the range of contractual contexts in which the term will appear, legislatures
and/or agencies mandating terms ex ante have a competitive advantage over
courts; when costs and benefits are highly context specific, the advantage is reversed. In the latter circumstance, a judicial review process based upon a modified application of the unconscionability doctrine can improve upon the status
quo and can be accomplished legitimately within the legislated boundaries of
that doctrine.
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This Article provides the findings of an empirical study of 187
court cases (case coding project) in which the issue of the unconscionability of a contract or a contract term was addressed by the courts.
The cases were drawn from two time periods. The first set of cases
can be viewed as the first generation of Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.)-style7 unconscionability cases from 1968-1980.8 The second
generation of unconscionability cases were from the time period of
1991-2003. The two groups of cases allow us to not only analyze a series of questions and factors, but also to make intergenerational or
longitudinal observations. The analysis is directed at answering four
questions: (1) What are the standards used by courts in making unconscionability decisions?, (2) What type of evidence is considered by
courts in making their decisions?, (3) What are the operative facts or
factors that are most predictive of unconscionability decisions?, and
(4) How do these findings inform us on the doctrine of unconscionability both as to its reflection in the law (expressed doctrine) and in
application (law in fact)?
Using actual court cases involving unconscionability claims, the
purpose of this study is to empirically examine the effects of selected
case characteristics on the outcomes of cases. Studies such as these
have led Nagel and Neef 9 to conclude that the empirical analysis of
legal cases is useful for identifying variables that are predictive of
case decisions. In developing a matrix of factors and variables to be
studied, we reviewed the law of unconscionability, the extensive legal
literature on the doctrine of unconscionability, and selected cases
from the two different time frames discussed above. Part II provides
a brief review of the law of unconscionability and analyzes some es-

Id. at 1294; cf. Robert A. Hillman, Debunking Some Myths about Unconscionability: A New
Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1981) (“[L]egislators cannot
successfully draft legislation to encompass unforeseen circumstances.”).
7. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2005) states in its entirety:
Unconscionable Contract or Clause:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without
the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to
aid the court in making the determination.
Id.
8. The U.C.C. was enacted in New York in 1963 and was quickly followed by other
states. Therefore, the initial U.C.C. unconscionability cases began to reach a critical mass
by the end of the 1960s.
9. STUART S. NAGEL & MARIAN G. NEEF, DECISION THEORY AND THE LEGAL PROCESS
(1979).
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pecially illuminating judicial opinions. Part III examines the unconscionability scholarship.
The analysis presented in Parts II and III serves two purposes.
First, it allows for a better understanding of the issues, both practical and theoretical, that have been discussed in the debate over the
role of unconscionability in a supposedly free contract law regime.
Second, the generally-accepted, bifurcated analysis—procedural and
substantive unconscionability—discussed in the literature10 and case
law11 is mined to isolate factors perceived to be important to the unconscionability determination. Statistical analysis of the coded cases
allowed us to measure the relative importance of substantive and
procedural unconscionability. More specifically, it allowed for the
weighing of the relative importance of factors, both procedurally and
substantively related, in the finding of unconscionability.
The factors revealed in the literature and case review were used
to create a matrix of factors. This matrix was then used to code a
randomly selected set of cases. Part IV presents the methodology of
the coding exercise, which includes how the cases were selected, the
dependent and independent variables, and the hypotheses posed.
Part V presents the findings of the coding project. A logistic regression model is used to analyze the relative importance of the selected
factors to unconscionability decisions. The relative predictive power
of the factors distilled from the literature and case law is presented.
These findings allow us to offer answers to some of the questions
posed by the scholarly literature and case law.
Ultimately, in isolating the operative factors in judicial decisions,
some insight into the underlying themes or reasons for unconscionability findings will be revealed. It is the hope that the empirical
analysis of the law, represented by the current study, will provide
the basis for a better theoretical understanding of the doctrine of unconscionability and contract law. At the least, such findings can be
used to support or debunk the theoretical constructs offered in the
scholarly literature. Finally, insights gleamed from the coding project
are used to support a new theory of unconscionability. Part VI offers
a consent theory of unconscionability that best explains the cases and
the relative predictive power of the factors measured.
II. DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY: LAW IN THE BOOKS
The counterpoise to absolute freedom of contract is found in contract law’s limiting or policing doctrines. The New York Court of Appeals, in Rowe v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,12 provides a
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.A.
12. 385 N.E.2d 566 (N.Y. 1978).
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statement highlighting the inherent tension between freedom of contract in the enforcement of contracts and freedom of bargaining in
the formation of contract:
It is, of course, far too late in the day to seriously suggest that the
law has not made substantial inroads into such freedom of private
contracts. There exists an unavoidable tension between the concept of freedom to contract, which has long been basic to our socioeconomic system, and the equally fundamental belief that an
enlightened society must to some extent protect its members from
the potentially harsh effects of an unchecked free market system . .
. . [T]he law has developed the concept of unconscionability so as to
prevent the unjust enforcement of onerous contractual terms
which one party is able to impose under the other because of a significant disparity in bargaining power.13

Section 2-302’s broad mandate to strike or modify any unconscionable clause or contract makes it potentially the most freedomlimiting device available to the courts.14 Of course, freedom can mean
different things depending on one’s perspective. Freedom of contract
here relates to the strict enforcement of the written contract. Unconscionability, along with more particular limiting doctrines such as
duress, undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation, question the
freedom of the bargaining.
An assessment that unconscionability was the creation of Karl
Llewellyn and embedded into the U.C.C. would be a misunderstanding. In fact, unconscionability has a long history in the common law15
and the law of equity.16 The criticism leveled at section 2-302 as be13. Id. at 569.
14. Because of its anti-freedom of contract potential, courts have generally been cautious in its application. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980’s: The Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203 (1990). Professor Farnsworth described the law of unconscionability as one of “arrested development.” Id. at 222-25. In
comparing the doctrine of unconscionability with similar principles in England, Germany,
and France, a commentator noted that despite the grant of judicial discretion, “an undercurrent of caution runs through the decisions.” A.H. Angelo & E.P. Ellinger, Unconscionable Contracts: A Comparative Study of the Approaches in England, France, Germany and
the United States, 14 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 455, 498 (1992).
15. “Though unconscionability, as an element in the enforcement of contracts, is equitable in origin, there is evidence to sustain the conclusion that the common-law courts as
well were moved by the doctrine to invalidate contracts under certain circumstances.” Industralease Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enters., Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 427,
431 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). See generally 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
128, at 188 (1952).
16. Often cited for the principle of unconscionability is the English case of Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, [1750] 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch.). The court set the general parameters for
nonenforceability as the bargain being “such as no man in his sense and not under a delusion
would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would accept on the other; which
are unequitable and unconscientious bargains; and of such even the common law take notice.” Id. at 100. The equity avenue for unconscionability was again acknowledged by the
California Supreme Court in Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981). The en-
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ing overly vague and indeterminate equally applies to equitable unconscionability. Moreover, “[b]ecause barring relief was a matter of
the chancellor’s discretion, equity never developed a clear set of rules
for analyzing claims of unconscionability.”17 Another court noted that
“[t]he common law doctrine of unconscionability has proved difficult
to define and has been rarely invoked undoubtedly because, other
than in exceptional cases, it has been largely viewed as grossly interfering with the freedom of contract.”18 The major impact of the codification of unconscionability in Article 2 was its transformation from a
remedy-limiting device to a substantive doctrine.19 By inserting it
into the Code, Llewellyn sensitized jurists to the necessity to police
bad faith bargaining and overreaching.
Ever since unconscionability’s enactment in Article 2, the courts
have grappled with finding the appropriate means of implementation. The following parts will analyze the widely accepted proceduralsubstantive bifurcation framework for determining unconscionability
and the development of a factors analysis used within this framework. A number of court decisions have been selected to identify
some of the more common approaches and variables (factors) discussed by judges. Part II.A reviews cases attempting to deal with the
procedural-substantive bifurcation. The possible approaches posed
include the need to find a threshold level of both, the need only to
find substantial evidence of one, and the use of a sliding scale approach. Part II.B examines cases where the courts have attempted to
isolate factors to be used in making the unconscionability determination. These factors were subsequently applied in our coding of cases.
A. The Procedural-Substantive Bifurcation
The courts soon responded to the skeletal nature of section 2-302
by focusing on the procedural and substantive elements of unconscionability. The distinction between process and substance has a
long history in the law.20 The real task for the courts was to provide a
functional approach or analysis to the abstract bifurcation of unconforcement of contracts of adhesion are limited by “a principle of equity applicable to all contracts generally—is that a contract or provision, even if consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties, will be denied enforcement if, considered in its context, it is unduly oppressive or ‘unconscionable.’ ” Id. at 623; see also Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (fee provision in a bank’s signature card).
17. Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 57 (Ariz. 1995).
18. Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 916 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
2002).
19. Id.
20. An example was the evolution of the English writ system beginning in the twelvth
century. “In contemporary language the common law was therefore a law of procedure;
whatever substantive law existed was hidden by it . . . . Gradually, the great writs began to
fill entire fields of human activity, which other lawyers recognized as fields of substantive
law.” H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 228, 230 (2d ed. 2004).
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scionability. The seminal case in this regard was delivered in 1965 in
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.21 Its precedential power
was restated in a 2002 case:
For the most part, the unconscionability cases follow Williams v.
Walker-Thomas and look for two factors: (1) unfairness in the formation of the contract, and (2) excessively disproportionate terms .
. . . Most courts have looked for a sufficient showing of both factors
in finding a contract unconscionable.22

The labels substantive and procedural unconscionability were
made famous in Leff ’ s seminal article.23 Since the Leff article, the
use of a procedural-substantive matrix in determining unconscionability has been widely accepted. The great majority of courts have
felt obligated to support an unconscionability determination through
a two-step analysis of substantive and procedural unconscionability.
The most troubling cases are those in which there is overwhelming
evidence of one form of unconscionability and little evidence of the
other form. Is a harshly one-sided clause insulated from attack when
there is no evidence of procedural naughtiness? Is a contract in
which there is no truly unconscionable component, but is one-sided
as a whole, insulated from attack even though there is overwhelming
evidence of procedural unconscionability? Or can the doctrine of unconscionability be applied where, despite the lack of an individual
unconscionable term, the contract is substantially unbalanced and
there is no evidence of bargaining naughtiness?24 One answer is that
the party challenging a clause or contract as unconscionable must
meet a threshold burden on both forms of unconscionability. An al21. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). A Lexis search found ninety-one district court,
twenty-one court of appeals, and two Supreme Court cases citing Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co. (last searched Oct. 25, 2004). Justice Stevens stated that “Judge J.
Skelly Wright set out the state of the law succinctly in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.” Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting). As recently as 2003, the 6th Circuit cited Williams as authority: “The crucial
question is whether ‘each party to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of
it, [had] a reasonable opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms hidden in a maze of fine print . . . ?’ ” Ohio Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Smith, 724
N.E.2d 1155, 1161 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Williams, 350 F.2d at 449). See also Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 313 F.3d 646, 666 (6th Cir. 2003). See generally Prince,
supra note 3, at 477 (“[T]he Williams formulation has gone on to become probably the most
often-cited definition of unconscionability . . . .”).
22. Sitogum Holdings, Inc., 800 A.2d at 921.
23. Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—the Emperor’s New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
24. Robert Braucher posed this question in the following manner: “Theoretically it is
possible for a contract to be oppressive taken as a whole, even though there is no weakness in
the bargaining process and no single term which is in itself unconscionable.” Braucher, supra
note 6, at 340. A common sense response would be that in a free market, survival of the fittest economy, such imbalanced contracts are not uncommon. Braucher’s response was that
such contracts devoid of procedural weakness were not common. “Ordinarily, however, an unconscionable contract involves other factors as well as an overall imbalance.” Id.
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ternative approach would sustain a claim where there is overwhelming evidence of one form of unconscionability.
Some courts have questioned the aforementioned approach of requiring findings of both forms of unconscionability. The Arizona Supreme Court noted that “perhaps a majority [of courts] have held
that there must be some quantum of both procedural and substantive
unconscionability to establish a claim, and take a balancing approach
in applying them.”25 By using a balancing approach, it implies that a
minimum of one type of unconscionability will suffice when there is
overwhelming evidence of the other type. The issue then becomes
what is the quantum or minimum threshold?
The Arizona Supreme Court also noted that “[o]ther courts have
held that it is sufficient if either is shown.”26 The court ultimately
concluded that “a claim of unconscionability can be established with
a showing of substantive unconscionability alone, especially in cases
involving either price-cost disparity or limitation of remedies.”27 The
coding project will determine the frequency of cases in which a finding of unconscionability was based solely on the existence of one type
of unconscionability.28
A middle ground, as discussed above, would adopt a sliding scale
in which greater levels of one form lowers the threshold of evidence
needed for the other form of unconscionability. The coding project
measures the degree in which both forms of unconscionability are
discussed and are required by the courts.29 As noted above, the cases
illustrate the overwhelming judicial belief that evidence of both procedural and substantive unconscionability is required to sustain a
claim.30 However, a number of cases have expressly recognized that
the threshold needed to prove both forms of unconscionability is not
fixed but may vary based upon a balancing or sliding scale. The two
forms are negatively related in that the greater the degree of substantive unconscionability the lesser the degree of procedural unconscionability is needed. This was the approach adopted in Funding
Systems Leasing Corp. v. King Louie International, Inc.31 The case

25. Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 58 (Ariz. 1995).
26. Id. (citing Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824 (N.Y. 1988)). The
Gillman court made it clear that cases based solely upon substantive unconscionability
were “exceptional.” Gillman, 534 N.E.2d at 831.
27. Maxwell, 907 P.2d at 59.
28. See infra Part IV.D.1-2.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 597 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); see also Ilkhchooyi v. Best, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 766,
775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he greater the degree of substantive unconscionability, the less
the degree of procedural unconscionability that is required . . . .”). It is interesting to note that
California’s unconscionability doctrine is codified as a part of its general contract law and not
just its law of sales. “The established doctrine that a court may refuse to enforce an uncon-
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involved the enforceability of a disclaimer clause in a lease-purchase
installment contract. The court described the case as an easy one in
that it found the particular clause to be fair and found no evidence of
procedural unconscionability. The court noted that the parties were
all merchants and that the disclaimer clause was conspicuously presented. The disclaimer clause appeared “on the front page in capital
letters and in red color.”32
The court acknowledged the acceptance of the “Leff test”33 that
distinguishes between procedural and substantive unconscionability.
But, despite this being an easy case, the court felt compelled to make
a “[s]liding [s]cale [e]valuation.”34 It concluded that “[a]pplying a sliding scale balancing of all factors, there has been an insufficient proof
of such unfairness as would justify declaring invalid an express provision of the written contract . . . .” Two of the factors that weighed in
the court’s reasoning were that “equipment leasing carries great advantages for the buyer-lessee” and “[t]he disclaimer of warranty by
the financing party is universal in the commercial world.”35 These
factors could easily weigh in the opposite direction. First, the great
advantages factor transforms such a leasing-financing contract into
one of necessity. Second, the fact that the clause is universal can
support a claim that the buyer had no alternative but to accept the
clause. Instead, the court reasoned that it was evidence of the
clause’s reasonableness.
B. Developing a Factors Analysis
As in most cases of judicial application of legal standards, the
courts will often enumerate a number of factors that they use in applying the standard to the novelty of real world disputes. This has
been the case in the application of the doctrine of unconscionability.
A review of the case law was undertaken to uncover, and to better
understand, the factors used by the courts. These factors were then
used to code cases to determine their predictive power or level of
commonality among a pool of cases. Alternatively stated, the review
of the cases revealed a matrix of factors weighed by courts in making
decisions. Many of these factors were then tested in the case coding
project. The purpose of coding cases based upon a factors analysis
was to see if there were specific factors or groups of factors that were
more predictive of a judicial outcome than others. If such factors are
present, then the development of a theory or analytical framework
scionable provision in any contract was codified in 1979 in section 1670.5 . . . .” Id. at 774
(emphasis added).
32. Funding Systems Leasing Corp., 597 S.W.2d at 627.
33. Id. at 634.
34. Id. at 635.
35. Id. at 635-36.
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for unconscionability may be constructed based upon such findings.
The factors emanating from the case review are grouped and analyzed below between procedural and substantive factors.
1. Procedural Factors
The role of a factors analysis is represented well in Willie v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.36 The case involved the enforceability of an exculpatory clause in a contract between a telephone company that had inadvertently deleted the advertisement of a business
customer from its phonebook. The court formulated a ten-factor test
to be used in applying the unconscionability doctrine. These factors
went to both procedure and substance. In the area of procedure, it
listed whether the contract was a standard form, whether the clause
at issue was boilerplate, whether the clause was hidden (nonconspicuous), whether the language used was incomprehensible to a
layperson, whether there was an inequality of bargaining power, and
whether there was an exploitation of the “underprivileged, unsophisticated, uneducated and the illiterate.”37
Courts are more at ease in recognizing factors indicative of procedural unconscionability than substantive unconscionability. The
court in Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp.38 provides a typical listing of procedural factors:
Under the “procedural” rubric come those factors bearing upon . . .
the “real and voluntary meeting of the minds” of the contracting
parties: age, education, intelligence, business acumen and experience, relative bargaining power, who drafted the contract, whether
the terms were explained to the weaker party, whether alterations
in the printed terms were possible, whether there were alternative
sources of supply . . . .39

The enumeration of such factors has helped courts flush out the
key operative facts on a case-by-case basis. The court in Nasco, Inc. v.
Public Storage, Inc.40 provides another example when it stated the
following:

36. 549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976).
37. Id. at 907. One commentator notes that judges often focus on the facts that one of
the parties to a contract is poor or uneducated. “However, these judges do not explain how
any of these characteristics are connected with the ability to make rational economic decisions.” Philip Bridwell, Comment, The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1525 (2003); cf. Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of
Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1977) (arguing that there is no evidence that poverty is related to incompetence).
38. 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
39. Id. at 268.
40. No. 92-12731-RCL, 1995 WL 337072 (D. Mass. 1995).
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[A] court may take into account a myriad of factors, such as the
commercial sophistication of the party claiming unconscionability;
whether such party was represented by counsel; whether the
clause was obscure or buried in fine print, or conversely, whether
it was out on the table and the subject of active negotiation.41

The case coding project measures the predictive power of conspicuousness, negotiation, and legal representation.42
One meta-factor that underlies most of the unconscionability
cases is the merchant-consumer distinction.43 The fact that an unconscionable clause was inserted in a merchant form contract in a merchant-consumer transaction has been a common factor in successful
unconscionability cases.44 There are few cases that have found unconscionability to the benefit of a merchant. In one case involving a
“merchant” farmer and a grain elevator company, the court acknowledges that “[a]lthough courts have been receptive to pleas of unconscionability raised by consumers, they have been reluctant to do so in
commercial transactions.”45
The courts have generally failed to adequately define merchant in
relationship to the unconscionability doctrine. However, some courts
have recognized that not all merchants are equal in sophistication or
bargaining power.46 They recognize that in merchant-to-merchant
transactions, the lack of sophistication of one of the merchant parties
renders that party susceptible to the type of overreaching found in
consumer unconscionability cases. For example, the court in Sosik v.

41. Id. at *5.
42. See infra Parts IV-V.
43. See Am. Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964). This was
one of the first cases applying section 2-302, and it symbolizes the use of unconscionability
as a device to protect consumers.
44. See infra Part IV.D.1-2.
45. Ray Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Weyrauch, 238 N.W.2d 47, 50 (N.D. 1975).
46. A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. Rptr. 473 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that a contract between enormous diversified corporation and relatively small but experienced farming company found to be unconscionable); Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144
(Ind. 1971) (holding as unconscionable clauses in a service station lease that exculpated the
oil company from any liability for its negligence, and obliged the lessee to indemnify the oil
company for any loss); Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (holding that although the notion of unconscionability is most frequently employed to shield disadvantaged and uneducated consumers from overreaching merchants and although findings
of unconscionability are rare in commercial settings, commercial contracts are not immune
from a finding of unconscionability under proper circumstances); Allen v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co.,
171 N.W.2d 689 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969) (holding as unconscionable a clause exculpating Bell
from any liability to yellow page advertisers for failure to include advertising); Shell Oil Co. v.
Marinello, 307 A.2d 598 (N.J. 1973) (provision in dealer agreement giving Shell absolute
right to terminate on ten days’ notice void as against public policy); Ashland Oil, Inc. v.
Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976) (holding that a ten-day cancellation clause in dealer
agreement, available only to company, unconscionable on its face).
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Albin Marine, Inc.47 focused on the level of sophistication of one of the
merchant parties. The court noted that the party was a merchant or
businessperson in the conduct of his business, but not a merchant for
the transaction in question. In that case, a charter service company
purchased a boat from a boat seller. The proprietor of the charter
service company had previously operated a failed construction company and then a credit card processing company. The court noted
that the boat seller was “a large, experienced boat retailer [and] on
the other hand, [the purchaser was] a relatively inexperienced individual, particularly in the area of purchasing boats to be used commercially.”48 The court found a disclaimer clause in the sale contract
to be unconscionable citing the facts that the parties were “not of
equal commercial sophistication” and the purchaser was “particularly unsophisticated.”49
Courts have sometimes isolated particular factors as most relevant. The Washington Supreme Court singled out conspicuousness
and negotiations as especially strong evidence against a finding of
unconscionability, noting that “[i]t is readily apparent that both ‘conspicuousness’ and ‘negotiations’ are factors, albeit not conclusive,
which are certainly relevant when determining the issue of conscionability . . . .” 50 The court recognized the importance of prior dealings
and trade practice as additional factors.51
Finally, the courts have not felt restrained by the sales-nonsales
contract distinction.52 They have liberally applied section 2-302
methodology to nonsale contract disputes, especially in real property53 and financial transactions.54 Twenty-five years ago, the Su47. No. 020539B, 2003 WL 21500516 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2003); see also Industralease
Automated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enters., Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1977) (merchant-to-merchant transaction). In Industralease, the court held a disclaimer clause to be unconscionable. Regarding the fact that a merchant party was claiming unconscionability, the court stated that the “term ‘unconscionable’ is thus flexible, to be
applied within the framework of the transaction under scrutiny, and considered in light of
the commercial climate then existing and the common law.” Id. at 431.
48. Sosik, 2003 WL 21500516, at *7.
49. Id.
50. Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 544 P.2d 20, 23 (Wash. 1975).
51. Id.
52. See infra Part IV.D.1-4.
53. Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915 (N.J. 2002) (holding option contract
for the transfer of property was unconscionable); Weidman v. Tomaselli, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681
(N.Y. Co. Ct. 1975) (holding attorneys’ fees that were disproportionate at law in a real
property lease were unconscionable); Seabrook v. Commuter Housing Co., Inc., 338
N.Y.S.2d 67 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1972) (holding apartment lease unconscionable and unenforceable); see also Jeffrey L. Licht, The Clog on the Equity of Redemption and Its Effect on Modern Real Estate Finance, 60 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 452 (1986) (documenting the increased use
of the principle of unconscionability in mortgage law).
54. Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
credit card company’s cardholder agreements were procedurally and substantively unconscionable); Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding secured
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preme Court of Washington acknowledged that “[o]f growing importance is the tendency of courts to find the Section on unconscionability, Section 2-302, appropriate to nonsales deals.”55 This is a clear example of the importance the Code has played in influencing the
common law of contracts.
2. Substantive Factors
The “ten-factor test” provided by the court in Willie v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,56 and discussed in the previous section, included a number of substantive factors. They include the existence of
an excessive price or “significant cost-price disparity,” a clause that
amounts to a “denial of basic rights and remedies,” penalty clauses,
and an overall imbalance in the bargain.57 The court’s listing of penalty and limitation of remedy clauses alerts us to the fact that certain
types of clauses have historically received heightened judicial scrutiny. These include the following: liquidated damages (penalty), exculpatory damages, disclaimer, covenants not to compete, limitation
of liability, limitation of remedy clauses, and arbitration clauses.58
One court acknowledged that cases involving price disparity and
loan at rate of 200% per annum on principal that rose to $99,000 was both substantively
and procedurally unconscionable); Ed. Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 324 N.Y.S.2d 813 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1971) (contract covering enrollment in school and financing); David v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., 287 N.Y.S.2d 503 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968) (holding jury waiver clauses on signature cards were unconscionable and inoperative in depositor’s action against bank); see Alvin C. Harrell, Basic Choices in the Law of Auto Finance: Contract Versus Regulation, 7
CHAP. L. REV. 107 (2004).
55. Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 593 P.2d 1308, 1312 (Wash. 1979); Baker v. Seattle,
484 P.2d 405 (Wash. 1971) (equipment leasing); see also Favors v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 309 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (bailment); Martha Shaffer, Domestic Contracts,
Part II: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 20 CAN. J. FAM. L. 261
(2004) (Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in Hartshorne v. Hartshorne, 2004 S.C.R. 22,
adopts a hard line on marital contracting, leaving little scope for courts to examine the
substantive fairness of the contracts); Joline F. Sikaitis, Comment, A New Form of Family
Planning? The Enforceability of No-Child Provisions in Prenuptial Agreements, 54 CATH.
U. L. REV. 335, 357 (2004) (questioning the enforceability of no-child provisions in prenuptial agreements, saying “[i]n assessing the enforceability of the agreement, a court will
consider the procedural and substantive unconscionability . . . .”).
56. 549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976). Other courts have applied the Willie v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. ten-factor matrix. See, e.g., Broadway v. Household Fin. Corp. of Huntsville, 351 So. 2d 1373 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
57. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d at 907. One of the factors is not really a factor but a recognition of the importance of context in the making of the unconscionability determination.
The court states that a factor to be considered is “the circumstances surrounding the execution of the contract, including its commercial setting, its purpose and actual effect.” Id.
58. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185 (2004) (asserting that there has been a resurgence in
the use of the doctrine of unconscionability over the years as the use of arbitration has increased; courts continue to invalidate unconscionability clauses despite the Federal Arbitration Act); Diane P. Wood, The Brave New World of Arbitration, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 383
(2003) (explaining that many of the cases focusing on the one-sidedness of arbitration
agreements also use the rhetoric of unconscionability).
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limitation of remedy provisions could apply unconscionability even
without any evidence of procedural overreaching.59 Section 2-719 of
the Code provides another example of heightened judicial scrutiny by
mandating that limitation of remedy clauses that exclude the recovery of consequential damages by consumers are per se unconscionable.60 The fact that certain clauses have long been scrutinized by the
courts may indicate that unconscionability is just another device
used by courts to restrict the reach of these clauses. The coding project will measure the prevalence of these types of clauses in unconscionability jurisprudence.61
III. UNCONSCIONABILITY SCHOLARSHIP: EMPEROR’S NEW CLAUSE 62
AND BEYOND
In the late 1960s, the first generation of unconscionability literature63 following the enactment of the U.C.C. focused on the vagaries
of the language of section 2-302 and the need to develop an analytical
framework to guide judicial decisionmaking. As one of the Code’s
most controversial provisions, it immediately generated tremendous
scholarly attention.64 The next two Parts will analyze a select few of
these seminal articles. The articles selected add insights and make
claims that will be explored in the coding project.
A. Defining the Undefinable
The most influential of these articles65 was Arthur Leff’s 1967 article: Unconscionability and the Code—the Emperor’s New Clause.66 Professor Leff criticized section 2-302 as an example of code-drafting that
results in an end product that “say[s] nothing with words.”67 He then
detailed the history of unconscionability premised on the finding of
both procedural and substantive elements. This bifurcation was
59. Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 59 (Ariz. 1995).
60. U.C.C § 2-719(2) (2005). See generally Jonathon A. Eddy, On the ‘Essential’ Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of U.C.C. Section 2-719(2), 65 CAL. L. REV. 28,
42-50 (1977).
61. See infra Part IV.D.1-4.
62. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 23.
63. See generally id.; Braucher, supra note 6; M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 759 (1969); Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975); Murray, supra note 4; John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931 (1969); Richard E. Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent, and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 359 (1970).
64. Bridwell, supra note 37, at 1513 (“Section 2-302 . . . is one of the Code’s most controversial provisions. By 1967, only 16 years after the first official version of the Code appeared, over 130 articles had been published on the doctrine of unconscionablity.”).
65. Professor Hillman refers to Leff ’ s article as a “leading article [in which he] . . .
suggested a framework [of procedural-substantive unconscionability] that courts and commentators have followed.” Hillman, supra note 6, at 2.
66. Id.
67. Leff, supra note 23, at 559.
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adopted as the dominate analytical framework in determining unconscionability.68 The coding project attempts to measure the relative importance of the procedural and substantive unconscionability elements
in judicial reasoning.69 Professor Leff also remarked that despite section 2-302’s shortcomings, “courts will most likely adjust, encrusting
the irritating aspects of the section with a smoothing nacre of more or
less reasonable applications.”70 Our survey attempts to discover if such
reasonable applications have produced a consistent jurisprudence.
Leff ’ s framework has not been without critics. Professor Hillman
rejects the bifurcation of unconscionability as “raising more issues
than it resolves.”71 Instead, he argues that unconscionability cases
can be divided into two groups: “common-law-doctrines unconscionability” and “pure unconscionability.”72 The former type primarily
concerns matters of assent. It is not the fairness of a term, but the
quality of the assent which is relevant. Professor Hillman poses this
question: “What is the relationship of existing legal doctrines such as
duress, undue influence, fraud, the duty to disclose, contract interpretation, and contract formation to procedural unconscionability?”73
He concludes that these types of cases are best handled directly by
the doctrines directly targeted to the issue of bargaining assent. This
is because these types of unconscionability cases are primarily made
up of assent cases and there is no need to consume the courts’ time in
analyzing substantive unconscionability. The coding project measures the existence and importance of existing doctrines, including
fraud, misrepresentation, mistake, duress, and bad faith in cases
that also discuss unconscionability.74 Ultimately, we conclude that a
consent theory of unconscionability best explains unconscionability
cases, including those Hillman characterizes as common law doctrines unconscionability and pure unconscionability.75
The relationship between unconscionability and common law doctrines pertaining to reality of consent (mistake, misrepresentation,
duress, undue influence) and other U.C.C. policing principles (good
faith, fair dealing, impracticability) raises the issue of the relation68. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Fid. Fin. Servs., Inc., 907 P.2d 51, 57-58 (Ariz. 1995) (“The
framework upon which the vast majority of courts construct their analysis consists of the
well recognized division of unconscionability into substantive and procedural parts . . . .
[T]his dichotomy evolved from a distinction made by the late Professor Leff in his oft-cited
article Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause.”).
69. See infra Part IV.D.1-4.
70. Leff, supra note 23, at 558.
71. Hillman, supra note 6, at 3-4.
72. Id. at 4-5. Pure unconscionability is the type that often involves findings of both
procedural and substantive unconscionability. In contrast, common law doctrine’s unconscionability pertains to procedural issues, namely, the quality of the assent.
73. Id. at 4.
74. See infra Part IV.D.1-4.
75. See infra Part VI.
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ship of unconscionability to highly-scrutinized clauses, such as limitation of liability, limitation of remedies, warranty disclaimer, attorney fee, arbitration, and exculpatory clauses.76 If a large portion of
unconscionability cases involves scrutiny of these types of clauses,
then the characterization of the unconscionability doctrine as broadly
applied would be debunked. In such cases, the unconscionability
analysis is either ancillary to the application of a more specific policing doctrine or is a purely redundant and unnecessary support for
voiding an offending clause or contract. The coding project measures
the frequency in which unconscionablility cases involve one of these
highly-scrutinized clauses.77
Two other issues raised by Hillman in his article relate to the current project. The first involves the role of conspicuousness in insulating a contract from a claim of unconscionability. Does full disclosure
or “superconscionable procedural conduct”78 eliminate the opportunity to find procedural unconscionability? Hillman concludes that
disclosure does not equate to understanding and, therefore, conspicuousness cannot completely insulate a contract or term from a claim
of unconscionability.79 The coding project survey measures the role of
conspicuousness in the unconscionability decision.80
A second issue raised by Hillman and others81 is whether unconscionability is available in merchant-to-merchant transactions. He
concludes that it is rarely needed in commercial transactions because
merchants are generally not “dependent” on one another (in the overreaching sense) and they are capable of protecting themselves from
the insertion of shocking terms into their contracts.82 However, Hillman asserts that unconscionability should be made available in the
rare situation where the merchant possesses the characteristics of a

76. Professor Mallor states that “[c]ourts have found substantive unconscionability
most frequently in various types of risk shifting or ‘remedy meddling’ provisions . . . .” Jane
P. Mallor, Unconscionability in Contracts Between Merchants, 40 SW. L.J. 1065, 1073
(1986); see also Ellinghaus, supra note 63, at 793-808 (discussing warranty disclaimers,
remedy limitations, submission to foreign jurisdiction, repossession under installment contract, and waiver of defense).
77. See infra Part IV.D.1-2.
78. Hillman, supra note 6.
79. Other scholars have advanced a greater role for superconscionability through disclosure and conspicuousness. See, e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of
Bargaining Power: Post-Benthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L.J.
359 (1976) (recommending legal rules governing disclosure, conspicuousness, and intelligibility of form terms in response to the problem of suboptimal information); see also Melvin
Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211
(1995). Professor Eisenberg suggests that form terms be enforced only when “separately
signed” by buyers. Id. at 311.
80. See infra Part IV.D.1-4, IV.E.2.
81. See, e.g., Mallor, supra note 76.
82. Hillman, supra note 6.

2006]

CONSENT THEORY OF UNCONSCIONABILITY

1083

consumer.83 We disagree with the implication that all merchants are
alike but for a relatively small set of merchants qua consumers. A
merchant, broadly speaking, can encompass any incorporated business.84 Given the popularity of the corporate entity, along with the
complexity of the market system, the unsophisticated or dependent
merchant is more likely to be the rule than the exception. Professor
Mallor in a 1986 article stated that “the case law reveals an increasing tendency to recognize that commercial parties can be victimized
by the same types of bargaining unfairness that stimulated the rebirth and expansion of unconscionability.”85 Our project measures
whether this recognition is reflected in a trend toward the greater
application of unconscionability to merchant-to-merchant or merchant qua consumer cases.86
If the typical unconscionability case involves a consumer, then the
characteristics of the consumer in winning unconscionability claims
is relevant to understanding the unconscionability doctrine as applied. The literature highlights three relevant consumer characteristics as level of sophistication, level of education, and socio-economic
status (level of wealth).87 The coding project measures the prevalence
83. Id. at 43-44. Professor Murray referred to this class of merchants as “merchants
in name only.” John E. Murray, Jr., The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 735, 778 (1982).
84. The U.C.C. also defines “merchant” broadly as
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved
in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his
employment of an agent or broker or intermediary who by his occupation holds
himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (2005).
85. Mallor, supra note 76, at 1088.
86. See infra Part IV.D.1-4.
87. See, e.g., Ellinghaus, supra note 63 (explaining inequality of bargaining position
and exploitation of underprivileged). Courts have typically used the doctrine of unconscionability to protect consumers. This consumer-protection theme is based on the belief
that consumers are less educated and less sophisticated relative to merchant sellers. As
such, they are more prone to accept unconscionable terms. Law-and-economics scholars
have argued that there is no support for this nexus. See, e.g., Harrell, supra note 54, at
114. “The gap between merchant and consumer, in terms of information and bargaining
power, has apparently narrowed rather than widened. The best consumer protection of all
has always been the consumer’s self-interest, and unsophisticated consumers often get the
better of larger and more experienced negotiating partners.” Id. at 114 (citing Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury
Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 296
(1995)). “By now it should be apparent to almost everyone that stature, resources, education, and a high income do not equate to wisdom or shrewdness.” Id. at 114 n.26. “Influenced by advertising schemes that rely on popular emotions, consumers are often lured
into merchants’ establishments and reportedly induced into unwittingly signing adhesion
contracts with onerous terms that cannot be viewed as representing consensual transactions.” Id. at 113; see also Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 716-21
(1992) (arguing that the economic model is flawed because consumers are unlikely to read
form terms or understand the terms they do read); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J.
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of these characteristics in unconscionability cases.88 It will also
measure whether these characteristics have become more or less important over time.89
Another phenomenon to be measured is the impact of the U.C.C.
Article 2, more specifically section 2-302, outside of sale of goods
transactions.90 The impact of the U.C.C. has been twofold. First, it
has had an impact on the law of sales as expressed in its goals to
harmonize and modernize the law of sales throughout the fifty jurisdictions of the United States.91 The second impact is its unintended
impact on the general law of contracts. The coding project measures
the proportion of nonsale of goods cases that make reference to section 2-302 and its surrounding jurisprudence.92 It also measures the
trend over time in unconscionability cases between the proportion of
sales and nonsales cases.93
The application of unconscionability outside of sales law should
not come as a surprise. As shown earlier, the use of unconscionability
was previously developed in equity. In sum, the unconscionability
principle was and is available in the equity wing of general contract
law.94 The interesting phenomenon is the “direct” application of section 2-302 by analogy to nonsales cases. For example, a New York
court in Joseph Martin, Jr. Delicatessen v. Schumacher95 states:
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code gives a court faced
with an unconscionable contract the power to refuse enforcement
of the contract or to strike or limit the unconscionable clause itself.
The unconscionability principle, however, has no peculiar application to contracts for the sale of goods. “Courts can, if they choose,

Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 483
(2002). A merchant-consumer approach based upon an economic analysis would simply assess whether a term is inefficient as a precursor to the application of an unconscionability
analysis. See Daniel T. Ostas, Predicting Unconscionability Decisions: An Economic Model
and an Empirical Test, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 535, 559-66 (1991) (claiming that contract terms
that allocate costs inefficiently are likely to be found unconscionable).
88. See infra Parts IV.D.1-2, IV.E 2.
89. See infra Part IV.D.2-4.
90. The potential use of section 2-302 outside the scope of sales law was offered by
Professor Ellinghaus in his 1969 article. He noted that financing agreements, although beyond the scope of Article 2, the courts will feel pressured to apply section 2-302 to such
agreements. Ellinghaus, supra note 63, at 767-68, 808-12 (“Going Beyond Sales”).
91. U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1), (3) (2005) (stating that the underlying purpose of the U.C.C.
is “to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions” and “to
make uniform the law among various jurisdictions.”).
92. See infra Part IV.D.1-2.
93. See infra Part IV.D.2-4.
94. See generally LARRY A. DIMATTEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF CONTRACT: STANDARDS AND
PRINCIPLES (2001) (tracing the principles of fairness of exchange in the common law, including the principle of unconscionability, to medieval just price theory and to AristotelianThomastic philosophy).
95. 419 N.Y.S.2d 558 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
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carry the principle over into real estate or any other kind of cases,
quite apart from the Code.”96

The idea that courts are free to carry-over the framework of section 2302 into the general law of contracts indicates that the courts generally
fail to fully recognize the common law precept of unconscionability.
The current review of cases indicates that courts directly apply
the factors and approach developed under section 2-302 without reference to any overarching equitable principle of unconscionability.97
The importance of this is that, by and large, section 2-302 unconscionability has consumed any separate notion of equitable unconscionability in general contract law.
One of the major criticisms leveled at the doctrine of unconscionability, as expressed in section 2-302, is that it fails to prescribe meaningful content, namely a workable definition of unconscionability. Section 2-302 merely allows courts the option of not enforcing a clause or
a contract or to limit their application when they find as “a matter of
law” that a contract or clause is unconscionable.98 The comments to
section 2-302 provide little additional insight. Comment 1 states:
This section makes it possible for a court to police explicitly
against the contracts or terms which the court finds to be unconscionable instead of attempting to achieve the result by an adverse
construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of offer and
acceptance, or by a determination that the term is contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract. The section
allows a court to pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or a particular term of the contract and to make a conclusion
of law as to its unconscionability. Courts have been particularly
vigilant when the contract at issue is set forth in a standard form.
The principle is one of prevention of oppression and unfair surprise
and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power. The basic test is whether, in the light of the
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the
particular trade or case, the term or contract involved is so onesided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at
the time of the making of the contract.99
96. Id. at 562 (quoting D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES §10.7, at 713 (1993)).
97. See, e.g., Art’s Flower Shop, Inc. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of W. Va., Inc.,
413 S.E.2d 670 (W. Va. 1991) (holding when flower shop brought action for breach of contract against telephone company that failed to include its advertisement in yellow pages
directory, the contract was unconscionable); Associated Press v. S. Ark. Radio Co., 809
S.W.2d 695 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) (holding when national news service sued local radio station for breach of contract to pay for news services that contract under which news service
was entitled to its profits during the balance of its term was unconscionable).
98. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1.
99. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2005). It should be noted that revised Article 2 makes only
one minor change to section 2-302 and its comments. It changes the word “clause” to “term”
in the body of the section. It makes no changes to the comments.
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Although it fails to provide a definition or clear framework for applying unconscionability, comment 1 has been mined for insight by
scholars100 and courts.101
Professor Ellinghaus in his 1969 Yale Law Journal article In Defense of Unconscionability102 offers a defense to the definitional criticism by asserting that the doctrine of unconscionability is not a rule,
but a standard,103 or what he refers to as one of the “residual categories.”104 Such residual constructs inherently create definitional problems associated with their application or use: “[N]ot all of the actually observable facts . . . fit into the sharply, positively defined categories, they tend to be given one or more blanket names which refer
to categories negatively defined . . . .”105 This application of negatively
defined residual concepts to law can be seen at work in the Summers-Burton106 discussion of the standard of good faith. Summers’
position is that good faith can best be defined negatively by the rec-

100. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 6, at 339 (quoting comment one); William B. Davenport, Unconscionability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 121
(1967) (discussing the notions of oppression and unfair surprise noted in comment one);
Murray, supra note 4, at 13-23 (discussing assumption or allocation of risks); see also Speidel, supra note 63, at 359 & n.2 (quoting the purpose of comment one to prevent oppression, but not disturbing the allocation of risks).
101. See, e.g., Willie Co. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976) (breach of contract quoting comment one); Lytle v. Roto Lincoln Mercury & Subaru, Inc., 521 N.E.2d 201
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (revocation of sales contract); Beneficial Commercial Corp. v. Cottrell,
688 P.2d 1254 (Mont. 1984) (warranty disclaimer clause); W.L. May Co., Inc., v. PhilcoFord Corp., 543 P.2d 283 (Or. 1975) (termination of a distributorship contract between the
parties, quoting comment one).
102. Ellinghaus, supra note 63.
103. Id. at 759 (citing Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV.
641, 645-46 (1923)). Subsequent to the publication of Ellinghaus’s article, a substantial literature has developed differentiating between rules and standards, popularly referred to
as the rules-standards debate. See generally Duncan Kenedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (discussing distinction between rules
and standards; benefits and costs of formal rules or “formal realizability”); Margaret Jane
Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 823 (1991)
(discussing that rules and standards are not distinct poles but vary in degrees of “ruleness”); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (discussing role of
discretion in rule and standard applications); Kathleen Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992) (analyzing the role of rules and standards in Supreme Court decisions).
104. Ellinghaus cites Parsons for the proposition of residual categories. Id. at 759 (citing T. PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 17 (1937)).
105. Id.
106. Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968); Robert S. Summers, The
General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
810 (1982); Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract—A Reply to
Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1982); cf. E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U.
CHI. L. REV. 666 (1966); Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in the Enforcement of Contracts, 73
IOWA L. REV. 299 (1988) (discussing the distinction between good faith in performance and
good faith in enforcement).
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ognition of categories of bad faith or what he has referred to as “excluders.”107 Thus, rules are often viewed as relatively closed devices
that provide discrete on-off application. Standards, in contrast, provide a continuum that gives the courts the needed flexibility to apply
the law to a diverse set of cases.
Defense of Unconscionability poses some interesting questions for
which the present research will provide some tentative answers. The
first series of questions revolves around the bifurcation of proceduralsubstantive unconscionability forwarded by Leff. Professor Ellinghaus
poses this question: “[M]ay the parties, by a sufficient compliance with
the proprieties of bargaining, insulate the contract from judicial intervention on the ground of ‘substantive’ unconscionability?”108 Does purity of procedure overcome a substantively unconscionable result? Alternatively, “what level of bargaining unfairness (if any) . . . is sufficient to entitle a court to refuse to enforce a contract for unconscionability even where the terms of the contract are not themselves unconscionable?”109 Thus, unconscionability scholarship has raised the same
issues as we saw evidenced in the court cases.110 Therefore, the measurement of the relative importance of procedural-substantive factors is
a major objective of the coding project.111
Ellinghaus concludes that unconscionability qua residual category
is by nature not susceptible to definition. It is, in Llewellyn’s vision,112 susceptible to definition and application only through a caseby-case contextual analysis. It is the novelty of real-world cases that
gives unconscionability its meaning. This meaning is not a fixed
meaning that Ellinghaus rejects as impossible to attain, but a dynamic meaning that is forever evolving and forever informed by realworld context. In the end, Ellinghaus concludes that the best that
can be done is for the courts “to develop a set of relevant questions.”113 The main purpose of the current project is to determine
what sets of questions or factors have been weighed by our courts
over the past thirty-five years.
The single most dominant or predictive factor alluded to by Ellinghaus is whether the claim of unconscionability is directed at a
form contract.114 The “problem” of standard form contracting and the
use of unconscionability as the primary policing doctrine has been
107. Summers, supra note 106.
108. Ellinghaus, supra note 63, at 762.
109. Id. at 763
110. See supra note 101.
111. See infra Part IV.D.1-2.
112. See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, Reason and Context: A Dual-Track Theory of Interpretation, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 397 (2004).
113. Ellinghaus, supra note 63, at 814.
114. “Most cases so far decided under Section 2-302 have involved ‘form’ contracts, but
the fact is as often ignored as commented upon.” Id. at 764-65.
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extensively explored in the literature.115 The project codes cases between form and custom drafted contracts.116 This coding, however,
only recognizes the fact of the existence of a form contract and not
whether it was a factor that was heavily weighed by the courts.
B. An Alternate Analytical Framework: The Circle of Assent
The vagaries of section 2-302 provided the opportunity for scholars
to offer analytical frameworks to guide judicial reasoning. One such
example is presented in Professor Murray’s 1969 article Unconscionability: Unconscionability117 in which he uses the English concept of
fundamental breach to analyze unconscionability. He uses it to fashion
a three-part approach to unconscionability: apparent assent, materiality, and genuiness of assent. He begins his article by providing the rationale for the doctrine of unconscionability through the recognition of
a circle of assent118 that surrounds all contracts. Murray’s analysis begins with how the circle of assent applies to form contracting and the
invocation of Llewellyn’s bifurcation of assent into specific and blanket
assent.119 For Llewellyn, written contract terms that are not connected
to either form of assent are to be disregarded.120

115. The evolution of form contracting as the most common form of contracting has
been recognized. As to the dominance of form contracting, Korobkin states:
More than thirty years ago, W. David Slawson estimated that 99 percent of all
contracts did not resemble the Platonic ideal of a list of jointly negotiated terms
but were instead presented by one party to the other on a pre-printed form. If
anything, the dominance of form contracts over negotiated contracts has increased in the intervening decades. The terms of mergers, joint ventures, and
very large transactions are sometimes dickered, one at a time in the classic
fashion, but nearly all commercial and consumer sales contracts are form
driven.
Korobkin, supra note 6, at 1203 (citing W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971)). The policing
of standard form contracting has received much scholarly attention. See, e.g., Jeffrey L.
Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
445, 489 (1994) (calling for an “expanded notion of unconscionability” to prevent “uneven
exchanges”); Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory
of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1299 (1993) (claiming that consumers should be bound only to the terms they know and understand); Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1174 (1983) (arguing
that form terms should be presumptively unenforceable); Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and
Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 132 (1984) (proposing that contracts should be governed by default terms some of which may only be overcome when the disadvantaged party
has given “intelligent and meaningful approval”); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of
Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21,
23 (1984) (recommending that the reasonable expectations of the parties be enforced).
116. See infra Part IV.D.1-2.
117. Murray, supra note 4.
118. Id. at 9, 12.
119. LLEWELLYN, supra note 1.
120. Murray, supra note 4, at 13-23.
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The problem for Murray is with Llewellyn’s concept of blanket assent. Instead, he utilizes the concept of unexpected consent121 as a better means to apply unconscionability to standard form terms. Unconscionability should be applied where the risk allocated is unexpected
and is one normally borne by the risk allocator. Professor Murray refers to the conspicuousness requirement of section 2-316122 as a
method for narrowing the reach of unexpected assent. But, in the end,
he asserts that conspicuousness is merely evidence of assent.123 Conspicuousness is evidence of apparent assent but not true assent.124 The
importance of conspicuousness (and of negotiation) in the unconscionability determination is measured in the coding project.125
Because of the fact that a clause may be the product of apparent
assent and not true assent, Murray argues that Leff ’ s bifurcation of
unconscionability into procedural and substantive does “little but add
more labels to the increasing number of substitutes for analysis.”126
Ultimately, Murray states that substantive unconscionability is the
primary aim of the unconscionability doctrine: “How does a court decide whether the unexpected risk sought to be altered by the expression of the parties is either insignificant (not burdensome) on the one
hand or ‘oppressive’ on the other?”127 Or is Murray merely substituting labels? The factors he utilizes to determine if a risk allocation
was “unexpected” are those applied to determine unconscionability.128
Murray’s tripartite approach to unconscionability includes the notions of materiality and verification. The first part dealing with apparent assent, discussed above, determines the apparent allocation of
risk. The second part focuses on the materiality of the risk being allocated.129 It is necessary “to determine the gravity of the risk being
allocated, for if there is no substantial burden imposed, there is no
need to go beyond the terms of the writing.”130 Murray refers to the
Restatement (First) of Contracts for the answer.131 Section 275 of the
Restatement provides a number of factors to be used to determine the
materiality of breach. Murray recites two of the factors: “What is the
121. Id. at 28-34.
122. Section 2-316(2) requires that any disclaimer or modification of the implied warranty of merchantability “must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous . . . .” U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2005).
123. Murray, supra note 4, at 19. He later states, “A court should not rely exclusively
upon conspicuousness as its guide . . . .” Id. at 22.
124. Id. at 21.
125. See infra Part IV.D.1-2, IV.E.1.
126. Murray, supra note 4, at 21.
127. Id. at 23.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 23-28.
130. Id. at 24.
131. Professor Murray also refers to the use of a “materiality” standard in section 2207 of the U.C.C. Id. at 7-8, 27.
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extent of the hardship on the party seeking enforcement of the clause
in the event the court refuses to enforce it?” and “Will the party
against whom the clause is to operate still obtain the substantial
benefit which he could have reasonably anticipated?”132 In theory,
such a determination between material and nonmaterial is important, but in practice, it begs the question. A clause that may seem
immaterial at the time of contracting will always be material in the
context of the subsequent lawsuit. The clause being attacked as unconscionable is generally the key to the outcome of the lawsuit or a
claim of unconscionability would be irrelevant. Thus, the hardship to
the party seeking its enforcement and the anticipated benefit to the
party seeking its avoidance will necessarily be substantial.
The final part of Murray’s analytical framework is “verification of
assent.”133 In the event that there is no evidence of apparent assent,
then this final stage is irrelevant. However, in the case of apparent
assent, this stage is triggered to determine if there was genuine assent. He describes this element as when the disfavored party has
knowingly consented to a material, “originally unexpected” (divergent from the normal risk allocation) risk allocation.134 This is the
area where the assuming party is aware of the clause, as in the case
of conspicuous presentation of the term, but has no genuine choice or
alternative but to accept. The clearest case would be the subject matter of the contract is an absolute necessity and there is no reasonable
likelihood of the “buyer . . . procur[ing] the item from other sellers
absent the clause.”135 The importance of consent to the application of
unconscionability is analyzed in the final Part V’s discussion of consent theory.
C. Other Issues: Legal Representation and Reformation
Other factors examined in the present coding project are the importance of legal representation to the unconscionability decision, the
prevalence of price unconscionability to see whether courts intervene
to void or reform a contract due to excessive price, and the frequency
of use of the remedy of reformation.136 The latter factor has been re132. Id. at 25 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 275 cmt. (1932)).
133. Id. at 28-34.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 32.
136. Recently, a Canadian court noted that representation by an attorney is a factor,
but it is not dispositive in determining unconscionability:
Although independent counsel is an important factor to consider in determining whether the parties voluntarily entered into the contract, absent other defenses, it is insufficient to demonstrate a lack of voluntariness. However, if the
party asserting procedural unconscionability was unable to meet with an attorney or if the advice was explained in an incomprehensible manner, the court
may find the voluntariness element absent.
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ferred to as “per se unconscionability.”137 This exists when the imbalance in consideration is so severe as to be considered unconscionable
on its face, as in the case of price gouging.138
Section 2-302 provides courts with the option of either voiding the
unconscionable term or to reforming the term to make it reasonable.
It establishes that courts “may enforce the remainder of the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.”139 This express statement indicates that the drafters intended
reformation to be the favored remedy, especially in situations lacking
profound procedural overreaching.140 The coding project measures the
percentage of cases where courts have reformed an unconscionable
clause or contract.141
IV. METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS
Section 2-302 recognized and codified the longstanding equitable
doctrine of unconscionability although, it did little to provide a definition or a set of rules for analyzing claims under the doctrine.142 In
order to better understand this doctrine as it is applied in practice, a
systematic methodological approach based on the coding of a sample

Sikaitis, supra note 55, at 358 (footnotes omitted).
137. Ellinghaus, supra note 63, at 789.
138. However, numerous states have adopted price gouging statutes to police this form
of unconscionability. Eighteen states have antiprice-gouging statutes with sixteen triggered by a declaration of a state of emergency or natural disaster. These states include
New York and Florida. Under section 501.160, Florida Statutes, (2005) it is illegal to
charge unconscionable prices for goods or services following a declared state of emergency.
New York’s price gouging statute is similar.
139. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2005).
140. Professor Ellinghaus concluded:
[A] court should probably begin with a bias in favor of “rewriting.” Where modification of the contract, by way of appropriate treatment of the unconscionable
component, seems to be capable of working a measure of justice, it would seem
unnecessarily and arbitrarily zealous on the part of the court to go further. The
court should, in particular, be on guard against an inherited bias tending in the
opposite direction, that is, against modification of the contract: Section 2-302
clearly calls for a break with tradition in this respect, and it is more in accordance with its mood and tenor to err here on the side of boldness than on that
of caution.
Ellinghaus, supra note 63, at 780.
141. See infra Part IV.D.1-2.
142. See supra note 4. This difficulty in defining unconscionability is analogous to the
courts and commentators difficulty in defining obscenity. This difficulty is evidenced by the
famous statement by the late Justice Potter Stewart in 1964. When faced with a case involving obscenity, Justice Stewart stated in a concurring opinion, “I shall not today attempt further to define [obscenity] . . . ; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly
doing so. But I know it when I see it . . . .” Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). This
statement also illustrates the difficulty of trying to determine what constitutes an unconscionable contract. Courts and respected commentators alike have grappled with defining
and applying unconscionability under the U.C.C. since its adoption.
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of cases has been employed. Cases were coded based upon a litany of
specific unconscionability factors143 enumerated in case law and legal
scholarship. Parts IV.A and IV.B describe the parameters and methodology used in the case coding project. Part IV.A describes how the
data was collected and explains the analytical tools used to analyze
the data. Part IV.B explains the independent and dependent variables that were tested and the hypotheses posed. Part IV.C enumerates fifteen hypotheses divided into two groups. The first group focuses upon the relative importance of the different procedural and
substantive factors. The second group assesses changes between different time periods. Part IV.D reports the findings of the factor associations enumerated in the hypotheses and suggests some conclusions. Finally, Part IV.E presents the results of a regression analysis
that shows the effect of the factors on one another.
A. Selection of Cases
Since the evolving nature of the law poses particular challenges
for data analysis,144 the cases sampled were bifurcated into two distinct decision periods to test for changes over time. All cases for the
years 1968 to 1980 and from 1991 to 2003 were sought where unconscionability and U.C.C. section 2-302 were mentioned. A total of 101
possible court decisions were located for the period 1968-1980 and 86
possible court decisions were located from 1991-2003.
It is estimated that this reporting database publishes approximately 38% of all appellate decisions and 10-15% of all district court
decisions.145 The individual courts of appeals decide which decisions
are published based on perceived importance and precedential
value.146 All published decisions since 1980 are included on
WESTLAW. Thus, although this data base does not cover all courts
of appeals decisions for the time period, the most important and relevant cases have been included. The WESTLAW computer database
was searched for the years 1968 to 1980 and from 1991 to 2003.147
Of the total of 187 federal court cases that were located for the periods 1968-1980 and from 1991-2003, 148 (80%) were included in the
sample or data analysis. A few cases (n = 6) were from lower court

143. See infra app. A (Unconscionability Coding Sheet).
144. See M.V. Roehling, Extracting Policy from Judicial Opinions: The Danger of Policy
Capturing in a Field Setting, 46 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 477-502 (1993).
145. See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 573
(1981).
146. See MORRIS L. COHEN & ROBERT C. BERRING, FINDING THE LAW: AN ABRIDGED
EDITION OF “HOW TO FIND THE LAW” (8th ed. 1983).
147. West Publishing Company publishes the Federal Reporter for U.S. Courts of Appeals decisions and the Federal Supplement for U.S. District Court decisions.
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decisions of identical appellate cases and, thus, were not included in
the analysis. Additionally, a large number of discarded cases were
those that were remanded back to the trial court (n = 17). However,
in eleven of these decisions to vacate or remand, the appellate court
provided guidance in the judicial opinion to the district court, thus,
these eleven cases were included in the final analysis. The remaining
cases that were discarded (n = 27) referred to unconscionability
merely extraneously or tangentially.
The procedures used in examining the legal cases were similar to
those employed in content analysis of secondary data sources.148 The
basic steps in analyzing each case consisted of the following: (a) selection of independent and dependent variables, (b) identification of
coding procedures, and (c) classification of each case according to the
coding procedure. Part IV.B explains the process used in the coding
of the independent and dependent variables.
B. Independent and Dependent Variables
The review of articles and judicial opinions uncovered seventeen
categorical independent variables that were then examined by this
study to see their relationships and influence on court decisions (see
Appendix A, “Coding Sheet”). These variables and their scoring included the following: (1) the parties to the litigation (1 = consumer; 0
= merchant); (2) parties represented by an attorney (1 = yes, 0 = no);
(3) parties that were unsophisticated (1 = yes, 0 = no); (4) parties that
were uneducated (1 = yes, 0 = no); (5) parties that were from low social economic status (1 = yes, 0 = no); (6) cases that involved a form
contract (1 = yes, 0 = no); (7) clause was negotiated or conspicuous (1
= yes, 0 = no); (8) excessive price or undue profits (1 = yes, 0 = no); (9)
clause was grossly one-sided (1 = yes, 0 = no); (10) contract was for
the sale of goods (1 = yes, 0 = no); (11) court found procedural unconscionability (1 = yes, 0 = no); (12) court found substantive unconscionability (1 = yes, 0 = no); (13) exculpatory, limitation of liability
or remedy clause present (1 = yes, 0 = no); (14) warranty or disclaimer of warranty clause present (1 = yes, 0 = no); (15) court discussed other policing doctrines (fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, good faith or fair dealing) (1 = yes, 0 = no); (16) clause was
voided or rescinded (1 = yes, 0 = no); (17) contract was reformed (1 =
yes, 0 = no). The dependent variable in the study was the decision
reached by the court. A decision finding unconscionability was coded
1, while a decision that did not find the contract unconscionable was
coded 0.
148. See OLE R. HOLSTI, CONTENT ANALYSIS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND
HUMANITIES (1969); Fred Kort, Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions and Rules of Law, in
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 133-97 (B. Schubert ed., 1963).
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Information on the case characteristics was obtained from the
published decision, which included factual background information
on the case and the legal arguments put forth by the parties, as well
as the court’s analysis and decision. Each independent variable was
coded by observing if the written opinion noted specifically that a
characteristic was or was not present. If the written opinion in the
case did not mention a specific case characteristic, then data for that
particular variable was treated as missing.
Using the coding procedures previously described, the cases were
coded by two raters working independently. For the seventeen variables coded, the reliability, or index of agreement, among the raters
was 93.2%.
C. Factor Association
To determine what factors contribute to a court’s decision in an unconscionability case, we posed numerous hypotheses to test. These hypotheses were divided into two groups. The first group statistically
tested the factors on the aggregated data set (both time periods combined). This aggregation allowed us to look at specific hypotheses with
greater statistical power than if the cases were not aggregated. The
second set of hypotheses specifically tested for statistical differences
between the two timeframes selected. Group A hypotheses are those
measured in the aggregate. Group B hypotheses measure intergenerational change. Finally, a logistic regression analysis was performed to
determine the global effects of the factors or variables when other factors were present in the fact patterns. In short, a logistic analysis
shows whether the predictive power of a factor or variable is enhanced
or diminished by the existence of another factor or factors.
1. Group A Hypotheses
The following list of hypotheses was formulated using the aggregated data from all 148 cases. First, we tested the likelihood of being
successful in a claim of unconscionability in general and when lodged
by a merchant party. We also hypothesized what affects a form contract, the presence of an attorney and whether the alleged unconscionable term was negotiated or conspicuous would have on claims
of unconscionability. Also of interest was the testing of the procedural-substantive matrix made famous by Leff ’ s seminal article,149
along with the effects of other policing doctrines,150 and the fact that
the challenged clause was one that typically results in heightened
149. See supra note 62.
150. The policing doctrines tested for were fraud, misrepresentation, the duty of good
faith, and “others.” See infra app. A. In the “others” category, the policing doctrines of duress, mistake, and undue influence were grouped.
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scrutiny by the courts151 would have on claims of unconscionability.
Finally, we were interested in testing the court’s paternalistic actions
in cases involving unsophisticated/uneducated/low socio-economic
status parties and the effects that excessive price or undue profits
have on the court’s decisions in unconscionability cases. Formally
stated, Hypotheses 1A to 12A are as follows:
Hypothesis 1A: Claims of unconscionability are difficult to win.
Hypothesis 2A: The number of decisions finding unconscionability
in sales cases is small.
Hypothesis 3A: Merchants rarely win claims of unconscionability
compared to consumers.
Hypothesis 4A: The likelihood that a successful unconscionability
case involves a standard form contract is greater than that for a nonstandard form contract case.
Hypothesis 5A: Findings of unconscionability require both procedural and substantive unconscionability.
Hypothesis 6A: A party represented by an attorney in the negotiation or preparation of a contract rarely succeeds with an unconscionability claim.
Hypothesis 7A: Unconscionability allegations rarely succeed in
cases where the alleged unconscionable term was negotiated or conspicuous.
Hypothesis 8A: A substantial percentage of successful unconscionability claims involve cases where another policing doctrine, such as
fraud, misrepresentation, bad faith is also applied.
Hypothesis 9A: A substantial percentage of successful unconscionability claims involves highly scrutinized clauses, such as limitation
of liability, limitation of remedy, liquidated damages, penalty, attorney fees, disclaimer, warranty or arbitration.
Hypothesis 10A: Unconscionable clauses or contracts are rarely reformed.
Hypothesis 11A: Decisions of unconscionability will be more likely
when the case involves excessive price or undue profits.
Hypothesis 12A: Decisions of unconscionability will be more likely
when the case involves an unsophisticated/uneducated/low socioeconomic status (SES) party.
Also posed were three longitudinally-based hypotheses enumerated
in the next section.

151. The “high scrutiny clauses” tested for included limitation of remedy, limitation of
liability, exculpatory, liquidated damages or penalty, attorney fees, warranty, disclaimer of
warranty, and arbitration clauses. See infra app. A.
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2. Group B Hypotheses
The following list of hypotheses was formulated by bifurcating the
sample of cases into two periods: 1968-1980 and 1991-2003. First, we
tested the likelihood that the success of unconscionability claims has
increased from the first period to the second. Additionally, we were
interested in the diffusion of the doctrine of unconscionability into
nonsale-of-goods cases. Finally, we were interested in testing
whether the courts have applied the doctrine of unconscionability
more favorably to merchants from one period to the next. Formally
stated Hypotheses 1B to 3B are as follows:
Hypothesis 1B: The rate of successful claims of unconscionability
has increased over time.
Hypothesis 2B: The doctrine of unconscionability has increasingly
been applied outside the law of sales.
Hypothesis 3B: The number of successful unconscionability claims
brought by merchants has increased over time.
The next part reports the statistical findings and whether the above
hypotheses were supported.
D. Findings of Factor Association
Initial descriptive statistics demonstrate that overall, courts found
an unconscionable contract in 37% (n = 56) of the cases sampled. Of
these cases, forty contained both procedural and substantive elements of unconscionability. Substantive unconscionability was present in 55 cases. In 41 cases, procedural unconscionability was present. Also of interest was that only 30% of the 148 cases present (n =
44) involved a contract for the sale of goods. Of these cases, the court
found 36% (n = 16) to be unconscionable. Geographically, New York
accounted for the largest percentage (23%) of cases (34 out of 148),
while Connecticut and New Jersey followed with 11% and 8% of the
cases respectively (16 and 12 out of 148). Overall, cases from 38
states were represented in the sample.
A series of categorical logistic regression models (LOGIT)152 was
used to fit the data using Proc Genmod in SAS®. LOGIT was chosen
because each court decision was coded dichotomously. LOGIT models
predict the likelihood for a particular category of a dichotomous variable.153 In this case, we were predicting the likelihood that any given
court would find a contract unconscionable.

152. See generally MAURA E. STOKES ET AL., CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYSIS USING THE
SAS® SYSTEM (2d ed. 2000).
153. See generally ALAN AGRESTI, AN INTRODUCTION TO CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYSIS
(1996).
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In the first step of the analysis, a categorical logistic regression
model was fit to the data to determine if decision year was related to
the court’s decision. This was done to determine if our data could be
aggregated across time periods and thus provide a larger sample to
test for significant effects of the independent variables. A chi-square
analysis154 revealed that collapsing across time periods was appropriate (χ2 = 36.69, p = 0.01). Therefore, we aggregated the data into one
time period to test for significant effects in group A hypotheses.
1. Group A Hypotheses: Results
Hypothesis 1A: Claims of unconscionability are difficult to win.
In order to determine if a claim of unconscionability is difficult to
win, frequencies were calculated based on court findings of unconscionability. Data revealed that in only 37.8% (56 out of 148) of the
cases sampled unconscionability was found providing support for
Hypothesis 1A.
Hypothesis 2A: The number of decisions finding unconscionability
in sales cases is small.
The number of decisions finding unconscionability in a sale of
goods contract was predicted to be small. Results of cross tabulations
revealed that 30% (44 out of 148) of the cases involved the sale of
goods. From these case 36% (16 out of 44) were found to be unconscionable thus Hypothesis 2A was supported.
Hypothesis 3A: Merchants rarely win claims of unconscionability
compared to consumers claims.
Hypothesis 3A posited that merchants rarely win claims of unconscionability when compared to consumer claims. Individual cross
tabulations were computed. Results of this analysis revealed that
34% (50 out of 148) of the unconscionability claims sampled were
brought by merchants. Out of these cases 16% (8 out of 50) were successful. While 66% (98 out of 148) of the unconscionability claims
sampled were brought by consumers. In 49% (48 out of 98) of these
cases the consumer was successful in their unconsiciability claim,
providing support for Hypothesis 3A.
Hypothesis 4A: The likelihood that a successful unconscionability
case involves a standard form contract is greater than that for a nonstandard form contract.
In order to determine if there is a relationship between the court’s
decision and the presence of a form contract, cross tabulations of the
cases that indicated a form contract was used were calculated. Results
revealed that in 71% (105 out of 148) of the cases sampled a form contract was present. Additionally, in 43% (45 out of 105) of these form
154. See generally STOKES ET AL., supra note 152.
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contract cases the court subsequently ruled the contract was unconscionable. Meanwhile, in cases where a form contract was not present
the court ruled the contract was unconscionable only 27% (11 out of
43) of the time. This data provides support for Hypothesis 4A.
Hypothesis 5A: Findings of unconscionability require both procedural and substantive unconscionability
In order to determine if the courts require both a procedural element and a substantive element to find a contract unconscionable,
cross tabulations of the cases were calculated that indicated that
procedural unconscionability was present. Results revealed that in
29% (43 out of 148) of the cases procedural unconscionability was
present. From these cases the court ruled 95% (41 out of 43) of the
time that the contract was unconscionable. Next, we calculated the
cross tabulations for substantive unconscionability. Calculations indicated that in 40% (59 out of 148) of the cases substantive unconscionability was present. From these cases the court ruled 93% (55
out of 59) of the time that the contract was unconscionable. To determine if the courts require both a procedural element and a substantive element to find a contract unconscionable, we further statistically analyzed the data. In the 43 cases where the court found procedural unconscionability existed substantive unconscionability was
present in 95% (41 out of 43) of the cases. While in the 59 cases
where substantive unconscionability was present, the court found
procedural unconscionability present in 70% (41 out of 59). Based on
these results, Hypothesis 5A is partially supported. More fully
stated, where substantive unconscionability is found without a finding of procedural unconscionability the contract is ultimately found
to be unconscionable 100% (15 out of 15) of the time. Only in one instance did the court rule that a contract was unconscionable after
finding only procedural unconscionability present.
Hypothesis 6A: A party represented by an attorney in the negotiation or preparation of a contract rarely succeeds with an unconscionability claim.
Cross tabulations revealed that an attorney represented a party
in precontractual negotiations 5.4% (8 out of 148) of the cases sampled. In each of these eight cases the court did not find the contract
unconscionable. Thus, Hypothesis 6A, which posited that a party
represented by an attorney in the negotiation or preparation of a contract rarely succeeds with an unconscionability claim, is supported.
Hypothesis 7A: Unconscionability allegations rarely succeed in
cases where the alleged unconscionable term was negotiated or conspicuous.
Cross tabulations revealed that when an alleged unconscionable
term was negotiated or conspicuous, the court found the term to be
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unconscionable only 22.2% (8 out of 36) of the time. This finding was
substantiated with a logistic analysis where the chi-square was significant (χ2 = 4.72, p = 0.02). In cases where the alleged unconscionable term was negotiated or conspicuous, the estimated odds that the
court would find the contract unconscionable is e-.97 or 0.37 times less
likely than if the claim did not involve a negotiated or conspicuous
unconscionable term in the contract. Thus, Hypothesis 7A, which
posited that unconscionability allegations rarely succeed in cases
where the alleged unconscionable term was negotiated or conspicuous, is supported.
Hypothesis 8A: A substantial percentage of successful unconscionability claims involve cases where another policing doctrine such as
fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation is also applied.
Cross tabulations revealed that out of the 56 cases where the
court found unconscionability existed, 43% (n = 24) of these case contained fraud, mistake or misrepresentations suggesting, Hypothesis
8A is supported.
Hypothesis 9A: A substantial percentage of successful unconscionability claims involve highly scrutinized clauses such as limitation of
liability, limitation of remedy, liquidated damage, penalty, attorney
fee, disclaimer, warranty or arbitration.
Aggregative cross tabulations revealed that out of the 56 cases
where the court found unconscionability existed, 52% (n = 29) of
these cases contained either a(n) limitation of liability, limitation of
remedy, liquidated damage, penalty, attorney fee, disclaimer, warranty or arbitration clause, providing support for Hypothesis 9A.
Hypothesis 10A: Unconscionable clauses or contracts are rarely reformed.
Cross tabulations revealed that in the fifty-six cases where the
court found the contract unconscionable, the unconscionable clause
or contract was reformed only 7% (4 out of 56) of the time, suggesting
Hypothesis 10A is supported.
Hypothesis 11A: Decisions of unconscionability will be more likely
when the case involves excessive price or undue profits.
Cross tabulations revealed that in only 15% (22 out of 148) of the
cases sampled did the court find excessive price or undue profits existed. Out of these 22 cases, the court ruled the contract was unconscionable 77% (17 out of 22) of the time, suggesting Hypothesis 11A
is supported.
Hypothesis 12A: Decisions of unconscionability will be more likely
when the case involves an unsophisticated/uneducated/low socioeconomic status party.
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In order to determine if there is a relationship between the court’s
decision and the presence of an unsophisticated/uneducated/low
socio-economic status party, we calculated cross tabulations of the
cases that indicated a party was of unsophisticated/uneducated/low
socio-economic statuts status. Results revealed that in 85% (22 out of
26) of the cases involving an unsophisticated/uneducated/low socioeconomic status party, the court found unconscionability, suggesting
Hypothesis 12A is supported.
2. Group A Hypotheses: Conclusions
Results of our analysis revealed that unconscionability claims are
difficult to win. As seen in Hypothesis 1A, only in 37.8% of the cases
was a contract ruled unconscionable. Also of interest was the relatively small percentage (30%) of cases actually involving a sale of
goods contracts. Since we initially only coded whether a contract was
or was not for the sale of goods, we performed a post hoc analysis of
the data to determine what areas of law the unconscionability claims
most frequently appeared. This post hoc analysis revealed that a
large amount of cases arose from contracts for employment, realestate sales contracts, and service contracts. Hypothesis 3A, which
posited that merchants rarely win claims of unconscionability, was
supported despite there being no codification limitation on the applicability of a claim of unconscionability in a merchant-to-merchant
transaction. Results revealed that relatively few (n = 8) merchants’
unconscionability claims were upheld.
Generally, the results of testing hypotheses in Group A indicated
that the use of a form contract increased the likelihood of the contract being found unconscionable. While the presence of an attorney
in precontract negotiations, or where the alleged unconscionable
term was negotiated or conspicuous, diminishes the likelihood that
the court will find a contract unconscionable. Interestingly, a statistically significant number of cases (n = 15) did not require a showing
of procedural unconscionability.
3. Group B Hypotheses: Results
Hypothesis 1B: The rate of successful claims of unconscionability
has increased over time.
Hypothesis 1B posited that the rate of success of parties bringing
unconscionability claims has increased over time. Individual cross
tabulations were computed across time periods. Results of this analysis revealed that for the period 1968 to 1980, 34% (24 out of 70) of the
unconscionability claims were successful while 41% (32 out of 78) unconscionability claims were successful for the time period 1991 to
2003. Although there was a slight increase (7%) in the percentage of
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cases where unconscionbility was found between the two periods, this
increase was not significant. Thus, Hypothesis 1B is not supported.
Hypothesis 2B: The doctrine of unconscionability has increasingly
been applied outside the law of sales.
Hypothesis 2B posited that the doctrine of unconscionability has increasingly been applied outside the law of sales. To test for the diffusion of the section 2-302 unconscionability in ancillary areas of contract law, cross tabulations were calculated of the cases that were
coded as sale of goods transactions and those designated as nonsale
cases. Results revealed that for the period 1968 to 1980, 54.3% (38 out
of 78) of the unconscionability cases involved non-sale of goods contracts, while 84.6% (66 out of 78) of the cases for time period 1991 to
2003 involved non-sale of goods contracts. In order to determine
whether this was a significant increase in the application of the U.C.C.
to nonsale of goods cases, a logistic regression analysis was conducted.
Results of this analysis indicated that year of decision was significantly related (χ2 = 15.06, p < 0.01) to whether or not the case involved
a sale of goods contract; thus, Hypothesis 2B is supported.
Hypothesis 3B: The number of successful unconscionability claims
brought by merchants has increased over time.
Hypothesis 3B posited that the number of successful unconscionability claims brought by merchants has increased over time. Individual cross tabulations were computed across time periods. Results
of this analysis revealed that for the period 1968 to 1980, 16% (4 out
of 25) of the unconscionability claims brought by merchants were
successful. The result was the same for the time period 1991 to 2003
where 16% (4 out of 25) of the cases were successful. Therefore, Hypothesis 3B is not supported.
4. Group B Hypotheses: Conclusions
Group B hypotheses tested for intergenerational changes among
the cases for the two time periods. Hypothesis 2B posited that the doctrine of unconscionability has increasingly been applied outside the
law of sales. This hypothesis was supported by a 30% increase in nonsale unconscionability cases from 1968 to 1980 to the period of 1991 to
2003.155 Results from Hypothesis 3B also revealed that merchants did
not fair any better from the earlier to the later time periods.

155. While the total number of unconscionability cases did rise from 70 to 78 (an 11%
increase) from the first period to the second period, this increase was far less than the 30%
increase of the nonsales cases.
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E. Results of Logistic Regression Analysis
Courts customarily designate more than one factor as relevant or
important in their decision, rather than expounding a bright-line,
single factor rule. Thus, several factors, rather than any one single
factor, might explain the court’s finding of unconscionability. In fact,
many factors are normally present simultaneously in a case and may
have separate and/or simultaneous effects on the court’s decision.
The presence of multiple factors may prevent or hinder legal scholars
and practitioners from determining the “real” reason for the court’s
decision. One could reason that as more and more factors are present, the likelihood of the court finding a contract unconscionable
will increase with each additional factor. In those cases where multiple factors are present, all may have been necessary for the court to
reach their decision without any one single factor being sufficient for
the court’s decision. This proposition assumes, however, that all factors are given equal weight by the court. In reality, certain factors
may be weighed differently by the courts. Thus, merely identifying
factors in a case fails to take into consideration their relative influence on the court’s decision.
As we have shown above,156 by coding the presence or absence of
certain factors in the case, we were able to determine the relative
importance of each factor being present and the factor’s relationship
to the court’s decision. However, to determine the relative importance of each factor individually when compared to all factors requires the use of logistic regression.157 This analysis takes into consideration all factors present in the case simultaneously with their
respective influence or affect on the court’s decision. This type of statistical analysis responds to the fact that courts do not compute the
presence or absence of factors in a vacuum or on a scorecard when
reaching their decisions. Certain factors we posit may carry greater
weight when compared to other factors, while some factors may be
necessary but insufficient by themselves for a court to find a contract
unconscionable. Courts often use a “factor analysis” or a multifactor
balancing test when reaching their decisions.158
156. See infra Part IV.D.1-4.
157. See supra notes 152-54.
158. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 416 (1984). The Supreme Court’s decision in this case is supported by a multifactor balancing test under the
U.S. Copyright Act. The “fair use factors” to be considered under 17 U.S.C. § 107 are the
following: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether it is commercial or
noncommercial; (2) the nature of the work (e.g., factual works are entitled to less protection than creative works); (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion of the work
used; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for the work. A court must
weigh each factor in reference to the other factors in the case before arriving at its ruling.
In contract law, the court in In re Antonelli provided this description of a factors analysis
approach to rule application: “Application of the rule, however, calls for a particularized,
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In this Part we analyze the factors that were enunciated in the
case coding project through logistic regression to determine what factors are significantly related to the court’s decision and also which
factors have the greatest statistical influence on the court’s decision.
The regression analysis models the factors that contribute to a
court’s decision as to whether a contract was unconscionable.159
1. Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is a multiple regression technique that has an
outcome variable that is a categorical dichotomy (0 or 1) and predictor
variables that are continuous (1, 2, 3, . . . ) or categorical. More simply
stated, logistic regression provides researchers with the ability to
model or determine the influence of individual case factors by identifying their relative weights or influence on the court’s dichotomist decision. In this instance, we are predicting the court’s decision that a contract is unconscionable or not unconscionable while simultaneously
controlling for the presence of multiple independent factors.
We started the logistic analysis by first hypothesizing the expected
factors beta coefficient’s sign and their relationship with the court’s
decision. Table 1 shows the number of cases in which the independent
variable was present and the expected beta coefficient’s sign. We predicted positive coefficient signs for those variables that, when present
in the case, increase the probability that the court will find the contract unconscionable. Conversely, negative coefficient signs indicated
that when the variable is present in the case the probability the court
will find the contract unconscionable is decreased.

practical approach rather than a conceptual one to the assignment question.” 148 B.R. 443,
448 (D. Md. 1992) (involving the issue of the assignability of a personal service contract).
159. Prior application of regression analysis in similar legal context has been used to
explain and even predict judicial decisions. Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 730 (1980), Jeffery A. Segal, Predicting Supreme
Court Cases Probabilistically: The Search and Seizure Cases, 1962-1981, 78 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 891 (1984).
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TABLE 1
LIST OF VARIABLES FOR LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
1 = CONTRACT FOUND UNCONSCIONABLE (56 CASES)
0 = CONTRACT NOT FOUND UNCONSCIONABLE (92 CASES)
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

EXPECTED SIGN

NUMBER OF CASES

1. Consumer Plaintiff

+

98

2. Merchant Plaintiff

-

50

3. Attorney Representation

-

8

4. Party Was Unsophisticated

+

26

5. Party Was Uneducated

+

21

6. Party Was from Low SES

+

20

7. Form Contract

+

105

8. Clause Was Negotiated or Conspicuous

-

36

9. Excessive Price or Undue Profits

+

22

10. Grossly One-sided

+

48

11. Sale of Goods

+

44

12. Limitation of Liability

+

43

13. Liquidated Damages

+

10

14. Disclaimer of Warranty

+

22

15. Arbitration Clause

+

16

16. Other Policy Doctrines

+

54

Table 1 provides several insightful comparisons. First, the only
hypothesized negative coefficient signs were the presence of an attorney, the plaintiff being a merchant, and a clause that was negotiated or conspicuous. These variables were hypothesized to have
negative coefficient signs since one would expect that if an attorney
represented the plaintiff in precontractual negotiations, or if the
clause was conspicuous, any unconscionable terms would be deleted
from the contract,160 while the coefficient for merchant was hypothesized to have a negative coefficient since courts have historically disfavored applying U.C.C. section 2-302 protection to merchants.161

160. Previously, one of the authors studied the importance of the presence of legal representation in the application of reliance theory to enforce precontractual agreements or
comfort instruments. See Larry A. DiMatteo & René Sacasas, Credit and Value Comfort
Instruments: Crossing the Line from Assurance to Legally Significant Reliance and Toward
a Theory of Enforceability, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 357 (1995) (concluding that the existence of
an attorney weighed in favor of a finding of contractual intent or reliance on informal
business instruments).
161. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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Correlations were then computed for all variables as shown in
Appendix A. From the initial computation we noted high intercorrelations (r > 0.85) between the three variables of unsophisticated, uneducated and low socio-economic status. This high intercorrelation is
not surprising given the similar underlying conceptual and methodological relationship of these three variables.162 To reduce the effects of
multicollinearity,163 which reduces the overall size of the test statistic
and thereby lowers reported significance levels, we collapsed the
three independent variables (unsophisticated, uneducated and low
socio-economic status) into one variable named sophistication. This
new composite variable, not surprising given the paternalistic approach of the courts, was significantly correlated with the court decisions (r = .40, p< 0.001). Also of interest was the very significant relationship between the presence of a one-sided contract and the finding
of unconscionability (r = 0.80). Excessive price and the presence of
consumers as a party were also significantly related to the finding of
unconscionability (r = 0.34 and .32, p < 0.001 respectively).
2. Logistic Regression Results
To reduce the effects of multicollinearity and to prevent the
LOGIT regression model from not converging,164 we chose to exclude
from the analysis those factors that did not have a significant first
order correlation with the court’s decision.165 The LOGIT regression
model contained the following factors: parties, form contract, negotiated or conspicuous clause, excessive price, exculpatory clause, arbitration clause, sale of goods, sophistication, and one sidedness. These
remaining nine variables produced a model that fit the data and significantly predicted judicial decisions (χ2 = 122.52, p < 0.000).
The logistic regression results appear in Table 2.

162. JASON A. COLQUITT & JOHN C. SHAW, How Should Organizational Justice Be
Measured?, in THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 113-52 (J. Greenberg & J.A.
Colquitt eds., 2005). Correlations greater than 0.70 should be aggregated since the individual dimensions are indicators of the same underlying construct.
163. See generally DONALD P. SCHWAB, RESEARCH METHODS FOR ORGANIZATIONAL
STUDIES ch. 18 (2d ed. 2005).
164. See supra notes 152-54.
165. See generally JACOB COHEN ET AL., APPLIED MULTIPLE REGRESSION/CORRELATION
ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (2003). Excluded from the LOGIT regression
model were the following factors: attorney, policing doctrines, fraud, good faith, liquidated
damage and disclaimer.
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TABLE 2
LOGISTIC REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS
DEPENDANT VARIABLE: FINDING OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
FACTORS

BETA

WALD

SIGNIFICANCE

EXP(BETA)

Parties

1.68

4.23

0.04

5.40

Form Contract

0.97

1.38

0.23

2.65

Negotiated or Conspicuous

0.23

.09

0.75

1.26

Excessive Price

1.60

2.86

0.09

4.95

Exculpatory

1.26

3.18

0.07

3.53

Arbitration

0.44

0.14

0.70

1.55

Sale of Goods

0.27

0.16

0.68

1.31

Sophistication

0.63

4.66

0.03

1.88

One-Sided

4.54

29.59

0.00

93.74

Constant

-5.27

17.46

0.00

0.00

Confirming our hypothesized coefficient direction, all variables in
the model had positive coefficient signs. The factors of parties, sophistication, and one-sided contract were significant predictors (p <
0.05) of the court’s decision. In order to interpret the coefficients in a
logistic regression, all betas must be transformed into odds ratios by
taking the exponential log of β. Thus, the odds ratios of 93.74 for a
one-sided contract indicates that when a contract is found to be onesided, the odds of the court finding a contract to be unconscionable
was 93.74 times more likely than if the contract was not one-sided.
Similarly, when the parties are found to be unsophisticated, the
court rules the contract unconscionable 1.89 times more likely than
when the parties are not found to be unsophisticated. Additionally,
when the parties are consumers, the court finds a contract or contract term unconscionable at a rate of 5.4 times more likely than
when the parties are merchants. Excessive price and the presence of
an exculpatory clause were also significantly related (p < 0.10) to the

2006]

CONSENT THEORY OF UNCONSCIONABILITY

1107

court’s decision. The odds of the court finding a case unconscionable
when an excessive price was paid was five times more likely than if
an excessive price was not present, while the presence of an exculpatory clause increased the odds of the court finding the contract unconscionable by 3.5 times.
Similar to the cross tabulations reported earlier in this Part, the
logistic regression statistically confirmed that courts take a paternalistic approach when deciding unconscionablity cases. The beta estimates indicate that the plaintiffs were more likely to win their cases
when (a) an unsophisticated party was involved, (b) the parties were
consumers, (c) the contract was one-sided, (d) the contract was for an
excessive price, and (e) the contract contained an exculpatory clause.
Interestingly, no procedural unconscionability factors were significantly related to the court’s decision. Thus, substantive unconscionability which examines the relative fairness of the obligations assumed166 can alone support an unconscionability claim.
V. A THEORY OF CONSENT APPROACH TO UNCONSCIONABILITY
The results of the coding project showed that the notion of true assent,167 despite the dominant role of apparent assent in the objective
theory of contracts,168 remains an overriding consideration in unconscionability cases. Part V.A that follows briefly explores consent theory. Part V.B then borrows from consent theory in offering a consent
theory approach to unconscionability. This approach is premised upon
the conclusion that the factors analyzed in the case coding project are
divisible into consent-questioning and consent-enhancing factors.
A. Consent Theory
In The Bargain Principle and Its Limits,169 Professor Eisenberg
provides the case for a doctrine of unfair persuasion within the principle of unconscionability.170 He proposes that strict enforcement of
166. Res. Mgmt. Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1041 (Utah 1985).
167. It is important to make clear that “true assent” is not necessarily subjective or actual assent. It can be understood as simply broadening the interpretative viewfinder of the
objective theory of contracts to include additional types of contextual evidence. It is a
search for a truer form of objective or apparent assent.
168. See generally LARRY A. DIMATTEO, CONTRACT THEORY: THE EVOLUTION OF
CONTRACTUAL INTENT (1998) (providing a historical and philosophical analysis of the subjective and objective theories of contract interpretation).
169. Melvin Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741
(1982).
170. Although akin to the common law doctrine of undue influence, his proposed doctrine of undue surprise would not require a confidential relationship. He states that
“[u]ndue influence, which might otherwise seem in point, traditionally requires a preexisting relationship between the parties.” Id. at 774. A doctrine of undue persuasion would “be
a defense to a bargain promise whether or not the parties had a preexisting relationship.”
Id. at 774-75.
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bargain promises should be limited in cases of unfair persuasion,
which is a subset of cases within his examination of the principle of
unconscionability, whose defining characteristic is the utilization of
bargaining methods that produce a state of acquiescence.171 The state
of acquiescence is a transitory state172 either fostered by the bargaining method or one for which the bargaining method takes advantage.
In this transitory state, the weakened party is incapable of acting in
her normal deliberate manner.173 This is a recognition of the divergence between the bargain principle as generally applied in contract
law to what is needed for truly free bargaining in practice. In short,
the former recognizes the contract as a product of bargain which requires the strict enforcement of the contract’s terms, while the latter
broadens the view of bargain from the narrow exchange of consideration to agreements whose terms are the product of free or deliberate
bargaining. Alternatively stated, the apparent assent of bargain is
limited by the recognition of a lack of true or actual assent.
The court in Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes174 explains that
“[t]he intent of the clause [Section 2-302] is not to erase the doctrine
of freedom of contract, but to make realistic the assumption of the
law that the agreement has resulted from real bargaining between
parties who had freedom of choice and understanding and ability to
negotiate in a meaningful fashion.”175 For this court, real bargaining
is premised upon understanding and negotiation. The existence of actual knowledge of the term through disclosure, best achieved through
negotiation, implies real or true consent.
Randy Barnett’s consent theory approach176 to contractual obligation is helpful to understanding the underlying rationale motivating
judicial decisionmaking in unconscionability cases—the search for
“truer consent.”177 “[A] consent theory specifies that a promisor incurs
a contractual obligation the legal enforcement of which is morally
justifiable by manifesting assent to legal enforcement and thereby
invoking the institution of contract.”178 Barnett concludes that “[t]he
basis of contractual obligation is not promising per se [but] . . . con-

171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 773.
174. 800 A.2d 915 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002).
175. Id. at 922 (emphasis added) (quoting Judge Francis’ opinion in Kugler v. Romain,
279 A.2d 640, 651-52 (N.J. 1971)).
176. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986)
[hereinafter Barnett, Consent Theory]; Randy E. Barnett, . . . And Contractual Consent, 3
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 421 (1993); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules
and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821 (1992).
177. Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 176.
178. Id. at 305.
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sent.”179 Professor Blake Morant offers this succinct statement of consent theory:
Appreciation of the limitations of objective assent presupposes that
individuals are not compelled to honor obligations that were not
willingly assumed. This is the essence of a consent theory of contract, which does not recognize objective manifestations as dispositive of assent. While an objective approach to the determination of
consent is probative, consent theory seeks confirmation of the reality of that assent. In the best case scenario, only true consent substantiates enforcement of obligations specified in the agreement.
Consent theory represents a moral and realist refinement of the
freedom of contract notion. Parties may bargain freely; however,
the objective manifestations of their assent may require greater
verification. True contract validity rests with the establishment of
real or palpable assent. Thus, objective manifestations, such as a
signature on a form, may not constitute the genuine assent necessary to justify enforcement.180

Jean Braucher asserts that contract law inevitably plays a regulatory
role and as such “[e]nforcement of contractual obligation requires external normative definition.”181 Acknowledging the central role that
consent plays in contract law she then admonishes that contract law
also must set “appropriate limits of consent as a rationale for contract
enforcement, particularly for enforcement of very harsh terms.”182
Braucher suggests that the status quo distribution of wealth and
knowledge is a reflection of an “imperfect world”183 and that imperfect
world limits the free exercise of consent. Thus, the relative “wealth,
power, knowledge, and judgment”184 of contracting parties provide the
grounds for inquiry into the validity of their apparent consent.185 These
insights of consent theory will be used in the next section to fashion
the framework for a consent theory of unconscionability.

179. Id.
180. Blake Morant, Critical Legal Studies (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). For a critique of Barnett’s “libertarian consent theory of contract,” see Jean
Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697 (1990).
181. Braucher, supra note 180, at 712.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 713. Because of the unjust distributions of entitlement, “consent is at best a
relative justification for contract enforcement, not an absolute one.” Id.
184. Id. at 712-13.
185. Braucher describes the common law’s invalidity doctrines (duress, undue influence,
mistake, capacity and misrepresentation) as directed toward the divergence of apparent consent with actual consent. Regarding unconscionability, she states that “[u]nconscionability
can be understood as a residual invalidity category.” Id. at 713.
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B. A Consent Theory of Unconscionability
The courts’ recognition and use of the factors tested in the coding
project can best be understood as a search for truer assent than the
objective first order consent represented by the signed contract. The
question then becomes whether the consent search is a search for the
apparent assent of the objective theory of contracts or something
more?186 The answer is that it is an objective search for a truer form
of apparent assent. The importance of conspicuousness187 indicates
that the appearance of consent, such as knowledge or the appearance
of knowledge, is an important force in judicial decisionmaking in this
area of law. However, there is also a recognition, given the importance of factors, such as level education and sophistication,188 the
merchant-consumer distinction,189 existence of other policing doctrines,190 that the appearance of knowledge does not equate to understanding or subjective consent.
The divergence between the appearance of knowledge and actual
knowledge is illustrated by Professor Speidel’s “circle of assent.”191
The circle of assent is bifurcated into “apparent consent” and “real
consent.”192 Apparent consent is best illustrated by the technique of
disclosure, and real consent is exemplified by the element of choice.193
Both are aligned with procedural unconscionability. The case coding
project proved that the existence of procedural elements of disclosure, or knowledge and choice,194 will almost always insulate a contract from a claim of unconscionability. However, even if both elements of consent are present, the needs of consumer protection still
dictate judicial intervention in clearly unconscionable contracts. This
consent plus paternalism is seen at work when courts intervene to
186. For Barnett it is something more. “In a consent theory, then, contracts are interpreted with an eye towards honoring the actual intentions of the parties.” Barnett, Consent
Theory, supra note 176, at 306-07.
187. See supra Part IV.D.1 (Hypothesis 7A).
188. Id. (Hypothesis 12A).
189. Id. (Hypothesis 3A).
190. Id. (Hypothesis 8A).
191. Speidel, supra note 63, at 362 (discussing Professor Murray’s template for applying unconscionability); see Murray, supra note 4.
192. Speidel, supra note 63, at 362.
193. Id.
194. Speidel’s analysis is specifically focused toward the consumer buyer. He offers a
tripartite test to determine the existence of choice or real assent:
[T]he concept of real assent apparently involves three questions: (1) Could
the consumer, by reasonable efforts at comparative shopping, have found similar goods in a relevant market area without the objectionable clause? (2) If not,
is the subject of the contract a frill or a necessity? [If a frill, then the decision to
purchase is a matter of choice.] (3) If a necessity, however, the last inquiry
seems to be whether the professional can justify the term as commercially reasonable.
Id. at 361-62.
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police covenants not-to-compete, antiassignment lease provisions,
and liquidated damages clauses. In these areas, courts generally
make no distinction between boilerplate and fully-negotiated clauses.
For example, a fully-negotiated penalty (liquidated damages) clause
between equally sophisticated parties is just as unenforceable as one
in an adhesion contract between parties of highly unequal bargaining
power. A penalty is simply unenforceable.195
Even if substantial fairness is the underlying philosophy for the
unconscionability doctrine, consent, namely real, meaningful consent, remains the foundation of contractual obligation. Substantive
unconscionability is the surrogate for the theme that contract law as
a regulatory device needs to ensure at least a minimum level of fairness in the exchange. Procedural unconscionability is the champion
of the dominant autonomy theme of contract law. Consent is the human vehicle for exercising freedom or autonomy. As such, it must be
incorporated into the application of any limiting or policing doctrine
such as unconscionability. Thus, it should not come as a surprise that
factors connected to the finding of a truer consent, then that simply
represented by a signed contract, have a high predictive power in unconscionability decisions.
The importance of consent-enhancing factors explains the predictive power of factors such as conspicuousness,196 negotiations,197 and
the existence of legal counsel198 in the unconscionability decision. The
existence of substantial evidence of a number of the consentquestioning factors can be nullified or counteracted by the existence of
consent-enhancing factors.199 Thus, when challenged terms were the
product of negotiations, conspicuously presented (or brought to the attention of the challenging party), or where the challenging party was
represented by legal counsel at the time of formation, the existence of
195. U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2005).
196. See supra Part IV.D.1-2.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. One of the boldest examples of a court focusing on a single consent-enhancing factor was delivered in Bd. of Ed. of Berkeley County v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439
(W. Va. 1977). The case involved the enforceability of an arbitration clause. The court pronounced a new rule in which all disputes would be subject to arbitration if the arbitration
clause was the product of negotiation. “The important words in the new rule are that the
agreement to arbitrate must have been ‘bargained for.’ ” Id. at 447. The court, however,
narrowly defined “bargained for” as cases not involving a contract of adhesion, when arbitration is inappropriate given the nature of the contract, and when it is deemed to be unconscionable pursuant to section 2-302. Id. Thus, the new rule begs the question regarding
the application of section 2-302. However, the court then clarified the importance of the
bargained for requirement in relationship to section 2-302: “Whenever a party can bring an
arbitration clause within the unconscionability provisions of § 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code . . . then that, too, would indicate that there was no meaningful bargaining
with regard to the arbitration provision and should invalidate it.” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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consent-questioning factors (for example, merchant-consumer transaction) is often trumped. The consent-enhancing factors support the belief that the apparent consent of the written contract is a reliable surrogate of actual assent. On the other hand, the existence of consentquestioning factors (lack of sophistication, low level of education, low
socio-economic status, etc.) will often show that the apparent consent
represented by the written contract does not reflect the actual understanding or consent of the challenging party.
Much like other policing doctrines, such as duress, undue influence and mistake, the doctrine of unconscionability can be viewed as
the court’s reexamination of the genuineness of the assent. A consent
theory of unconscionability best explains the jurisprudence that has
developed since the adoption of section 2-302 of the U.C.C. An overreaching clause will not be viewed as unconscionable if there is evidence of knowing consent. Evidence of superconscionability or what
Arthur Leff referred to as “super-assent,”200 such as clear disclosure
(written and/or oral), negotiation, or express “signing off,”201 bolsters
the case for actual or knowing consent. The notion of particularized
or deliberative consent in the bargaining phase will generally insulate a one-sided clause from a claim of unconscionability. Cases that
focused on evidence that the challenged clause was conspicuous, either by way of its presentation in the contract or by notification by
the clause-benefiting party, or that the clause itself was a product of
negotiation or was part of the menu of terms that were subject to negotiation, or that the party challenging the clause or contract was
represented by an attorney at the time of formation, overwhelmingly
failed to find unconscionability. Cases in which there was some evidence of negotiation or conspicuousness relating to the challenged
clause had only a 22% success rate for unconscionability claims.202
Only 5.4% of the cases acknowledged the existence of legal counsel at
the time of formation and none were successful.203 However, in all of
those cases the party challenging the clause failed on its unconscionability claim. In addition, the success rate is appreciably higher for
challenged clauses in standard form contracts (42.9%) than for
clauses found in custom or nonstandard form contracts. This is likely
due to the fact that the level of negotiation and the level of conspic200. The concept of superconscionability is not a novel one. Arthur Leff in a 1970 article wrote of “super-disclosure” and “super-assent” that “one can imagine instances of some
sort of super-disclosure by a seller, coupled with some sort of super-assent by a consumer,
which might validate an otherwise ‘unconscionable’ provision.” Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L.
REV. 349, 349-50 (1970).
201. “Signing off ” refers to the technique of having a party sign or initial clauses that
the other party wants to insulate from future charges of unconscionability.
202. See supra Part IV.D.1-2.
203. Id.
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uousness is lower in standard form contracting than in nonstandard
form contracting.
Another indicator that supports a consent theory of unconscionability includes the high degree of the existence of other policing doctrines (47%) in successful unconscionability cases.204 The fact that
almost half of the successful unconscionability cases also discussed
other policing doctrines is significant. The doctrines of fraud, misrepresentation, mistake, and undue influence all involve the element of
genuineness of consent. The fact that true consent is an element discussed in the fact patterns of these cases supports the finding that
the underlying factor in the courts’ analysis is consent-based.
The higher success rates for specific types of clauses, such as arbitration clauses (75%), liquidated damages clauses (60%), limitation of
liability or remedy clauses (51%), and disclaimer or warranty clauses
(41%), as compared to an overall success rate for unconscionability
claims of 37.8%, works against a consent theory of unconscionability.205 Much like the law on covenants not-to-compete,206 the fact that
the parties consented to the particular clause is largely irrelevant.
These types of clauses are part of a list of highly scrutinized clauses
that courts have traditionally policed under the rubric of public policy. These clauses are policed due to their inherent substantive
naughtiness. A consent theory, however, can still be sustained by the
fact that these particular clauses have been historically or statutorily207 disenfranchised from the rubric of freedom of contract enforceability. Therefore, the cases involving these types of clauses are
really not true unconscionability cases. A separate body of jurisprudence is being utilized to void or reform these clauses. The fact that
the clauses are or are not unconscionable is beside the point. For example, an overly broad covenant not-to-compete will be reformed
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See generally T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition Cases, AM. BUS. L.J. (2006) (forthcoming) (on file with author) (discussing the role of
equitable principles in the enforcement between competitors of employee noncompetition
agreements); Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A
Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes,
80 OR. L. REV. 1163 (2001) (discussing the role of corporate scandals and the problem of
“brain drain” in the enforcement of such covenants); Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 629-31 (1960) (tracing the general enforceability of covenants not-to-compete to the 18th century); Samuel C. Damren, The Theory of
“Involuntary” Contracts: The Judicial Rewriting of Unreasonable Covenants Not to Compete, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 71 (1999) (analyzing cases involving judicial revision);
Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999) (discussing
the economic incentives of employers to continue requiring such agreements); see also Frederick E. Hines, Employees’ Covenants Not to Solicit Former Patrons, 20 CAL. L. REV. 607
(1932) (discussing the associated nonsolicitation agreement).
207. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-718, -719 (liquidated damages and limitation of remedy clauses).
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even in cases of super-procedural conscionability because of the policy against restraints of competition.208 Liquidated damages clauses
are often voided due to the policy against punitive or supercompensatory damages in contract law.209 The fact that the parties
negotiated the clauses is irrelevant.210
The low rate of reformation (7%) can also be seen as supporting a
consent theory of unconscionability. As previously discussed, section
2-302 emphasizes the remedy of reformation in addressing unconscionable clauses or contracts.211 The rationale would seem to be that
since the parties inserted the clause in their contract they, at some
level, intended that the issue addressed by the clause be covered by
the contract. For example, if the parties’ contract included a conspicuously presented per diem liquidated damages or penalty clause,
then the objective theory of contract would hold that such a clause is
reflective of contractual intent.212 Therefore, instead of voiding the
clause, a rewriting of the clause to be conscionable would be truer to
contractual intent. The fact that few unconscionable clauses are reformed reflects the courts’ belief that such clauses or contracts do not
possess even a modicum of consent.
In the end, as in all forms of litigation, the success of a claim of
unconscionability is dependent upon evidentiary matters. The designation of factors as consent-enhancing and consent-questioning aids
in properly apportioning such matters of evidential burdens of proof.
The party claiming unconscionability should bear the burden of proving the existence of sufficient consent-questioning factors. The party
asserting the enforceability of the challenged clause or contract has
the burden in rebutting the claim of unconscionability by proving the
existence of countervailing procedural-based, consent-enhancing factors. The clause or contract defending party, especially in a merchant-consumer transaction, should also bear the burden of proving
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §§ 186, 188 (1979) (“A promise is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if it is unreasonably in restraint of trade.”). A restriction is
unreasonably in restraint of trade if “the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the
promisee’s legitimate interest.” Id. § 188(1)(a).
209. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of
Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 633 (2001) (reviewing the law of liquidated damages).
210. Other examples include antiassignment clauses in real property leases and exculpatory clauses. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Vazquez, 397 So. 2d. 1171 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (explaining that leases are presumed to be assignable unless the landlord gives a commercially reasonable reason for withholding consent); Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709
P.2d 837 (Cal. 1985) (en banc). See generally Murray S. Levin, Withholding Consent to Assignment: The Changing Rights of the Commercial Landlord, 30 DEPAUL L. REV. 109
(1980) (“ ‘[A] landlord may not unreasonably and capriciously withhold his consent.’ ”
(quoting Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So. 2d 1035, 1038 (Ala. 1977))).
211. See supra Part IV.D.1-2.
212. See generally DIMATTEO, supra note 168; Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of
Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L.
REV. 293, 329-31 (1997).
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the substantive reasonableness of the challenged clause when the
balancing of consent-enhancing and consent-questioning factors is
indeterminate.213 It is this battle over the finding of a truer form of
apparent consent that best explains the law of unconscionability as
applied under the rubric of section 2-302.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the codification of the unconscionability principle in section2-302, questions have persisted as to its meaning and the rationality
of its application. This Article reported the findings of a case coding
project of unconscionability cases taken from two different time periods. This allowed for the measuring of factors in the aggregate and
intergenerationally. The findings presented confirmed a number of
widely held assumptions. The findings support the hypothesis that it
is very difficult for a merchant to succeed in an unconscionability
claim. It also confirmed the importance of section 2-302 methodology
to the common law of contracts. The importance of factors such as
the use of standard forms and the level of education, sophistication,
and socio-economic status of the challenging party was confirmed. In
addition, the rarity of use by the courts of the remedy of reformation
was confirmed. Finally, the success rate of unconscionability claims
has remained remarkably stable over the past three to four decades.
The findings also showed that about half or more of all unconscionability cases may not be “true” unconscionability cases. A significant
number of cases had other principles of law or public policy at stake
other than the principle of unconscionability. These included cases involving other policing doctrines such as mistake, misrepresentation,
fraud, undue influence, and bad faith, and cases involving highlyscrutinized types of clauses such as exculpatory, arbitration, limitation
of liability or remedies, liquidated damages, warranty or disclaimer of
warranty. In these cases there were other bodies of jurisprudence or
doctrines available to the courts in rendering their decisions.
The findings of the case coding project supports a consent theory
of unconscionability as the best means to understand the case law.
The types of factors utilized by the courts in making unconscionability determinations are separable into consent-questioning and consent-enhancing factors. The existence of standard forms, other policing doctrines, levels of education and sophistication provided the
avenue for courts to question the true consent of the parties relating
213. Professor Spiedel previously argued for this allocation of the substantive burden
of proof: “[T]he professional [merchant] should have the burden of establishing the commercial reasonableness of the disputed term.” Editors, Unconscionability: An Attempt at
Definition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 333, 335 (1970) (summarizing Spiedel’s position by law review editors).
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to the challenged clause or contract. Other factors, such as representation by legal counsel, conspicuousness, and negotiations, enhanced
the courts propensity to find that the apparent consent represented
by the written contract was indeed a reflection of the true understanding of the parties.
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APPENDIX A
UNCONSCIONABILITY CODING SHEET
Case Number________ Jurisdiction____________ State__________ Year________
1. Court Found Unconscionability (circle one): Yes No Case Remanded W/O Finding
2. Parties (circle one):
Consumer
Merchant
3. Did the court find Procedural Unconscionability? (circle one): Yes No
•
Did the court discuss procedural unconscionability? (circle one): Yes No
•
Did case involve a Form Contract (circle one): Yes No
•
Was the clause being challenged negotiated or conspicuous? Yes No
4. Consumer Was:
•
Unsophisticated (circle one): Yes No
•
Uneducated (circle one): Yes No
•
Low SES (circle one): Yes No
5. Parties Represented By Attorney (circle one): Yes No
6. Evidence Of Other Doctrines Presented:
•
Did the court discuss other “policing doctrines”? (circle one): Yes No
•
Fraud or misrepresentation (circle one): Yes No
•
Did the court discuss good faith and/or fair dealing? (circle one): Yes No
7. Substantive Unconscionability Present (circle one): Yes No
•
Did the court discuss substantive unconscionability? Yes No
•
Excessive Price or undue profits (circle one): Yes No
•
Clause was considered grossly one-sided? Yes No
8. Additional Clauses Present:
•
Exculpatory, Limitation of Liability, or Limitation of Remedy (circle one): Yes No
•
Liquidated Damage, Penalty Clause, or Attorney Fee Clause Yes No
•
Disclaimer or Warranty Clause (circle one): Yes No
•
Arbitration Clause (circle one): Yes No
9. Result:
•
Clause Voided/Rescission (circle one): Yes No
•
Contract Reformed (circle one): Yes No
10. Type of Contract
•
Was this a sale of goods transaction? (circle one): Yes No
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